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Hospitals and the Disruptive Health Care
Practitioner-Is the Inability to Work with Others
Enough to Warrant Exclusion?
Eric W. Springer*
Henry M. Casale**
It isn't the experience of today that drives men mad. It is the remorse for
something that happened yesterday, and the dread of what tomorrow may
disclose.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care professionals, particularly physicians, are prime ex-
amples of those who regret yesterday's passing and dread the ad-
vent of tomorrow. The attitude is quite understandable. Medical
practice was so much easier and more comfortable twenty-five, fif-
teen, even ten years ago. Managing a hospital or other health care
facility was child's play compared to the present. Hospital gov-
erning board members were proud of their institutions but knew
very little about what went on within their walls. The hospital was
the doctor's workshop; things were under control.
The pressures and dilemmas that modern hospital management'
faces were not imagined just a few short years ago. Much of this
pressure and many of these dilemmas come about because of the
increasing involvement-some would call it intrusion-of the law
in health care matters. Federal and state regulatory schemes domi-
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1. R. BURDETTE, THE GOLDEN DAY.
2. In this article, we will use the term "hospital management" to denote not only the
chief executive officer and the administrative staff, but also the medical staff leadership
consisting of officers, department or service chiefs, and chairmen of committees. The term,
of course, also includes hospital boards of trustees/directors.
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nate the institution's and the practitioner's decisions.' Adaptation
3. A hospital's actions, policies, and procedures must comply with the specific require-
ments of a plethora of federal and state statutes and regulations (for illustrative purposes,
Pennsylvania law is cited).
Federal:
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984), Regulations, 50
Fed. Reg. 14,878 (1985), Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant
Care Review Committees, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,493 (1985); Social Security Act (Medicare Provi-
sions), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395c-1395xx (West 1983), Medicare Conditions of Participation for
Hospitals, 42 C.F.R. § 405.1011 (1984), Medicare Regulations for the Detection and Preven-
tion of Fraud and Abuse, 42 C.F.R. § 420.1 (1984); Social Security Amendments of 1983
(establishing a Prospective Payment Mechanism for Inpatient Medicare Costs), PUB. L. 98-
21, § 601, 97 Stat. 149 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww (West 1983)), Regulations, 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.470 (1984); National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C.A. § 300k (West 1983), Regulations, 42 C.F.R. §§ 121-124 (1985); Equal Employment
Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000-c (West 1983), Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.7-
1602.14 (1985); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 (West Supp. 1985); Fair Labor
Standards Act (including Equal Pay Act) 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1982), Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§
516.2-516.10 (1985); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A §§ 621-634 (West
Supp. 1985), Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1985); Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 291 (1982),
Regulations, Services for Persons Unable to Pay, 42 C.F.R. § 124.501 (1985); Drug Abuse
Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act, Admission of Drug Abusers to Private and
Public Hospitals, 42 U.S.C.A. § 290ee-2 (West Supp. 1985), Regulations, 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-
84.47 (1985); Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act, Confidentiality of
Patient Records, 42 U.S.C.A. § 290ee-3 (West Supp. 1985), Regulations, Confidentiality of
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. § 2 (1985); Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-392 (1982), Regulations, Institutional Review Boards, 21 C.F.R. §§
56.101-56.124, 21 C.F.R. §§ 813.60-813.79 (1985), and Informed Consent of Human Subjects,
21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20-50.27 (1985); Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 811
(1982), Regulations, 21 C.F.R. § 1306 (1985).
State: (Pennsylvania)
Public Welfare Code, PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 901-1059 (Purdon 1968), Rules and Regulations,
General and Special Hospitals, 28 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 101.1-155.8 (1983); Non-Profit Corpo-
rations Law, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7101 (Purdon 1984); Health Care Facilities Act, 35
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 448.101-448.903 (Purdon Supp. 1985), Regulations, 28 PA. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 405.1-405.5 (1985); Medical Assistance for the Aged, 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
444.1 (Purdon Supp. 1985); Fraud and Abuse Control, 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1401-1411
(Purdon Supp. 1985); Child Protective Services Law, 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2201 (Pur-
don Supp. 1985); Peer Review Protection Act, 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 425.1-425.4 (Pur-
don Supp. 1985); Professional Health Services Malpractice Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1301.103 (Purdon 1985); Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
1690.101-1690.109 (Purdon Supp. 1985); Anatomical Gifts, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8601
(Purdon Supp. 1985); Reports by Emergency Room Personnel, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3755 (Purdon 1985); Liquor Control Code, 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-408.4 (Purdon Supp.
1985); An Act Prohibiting Smoking in Patients' Rooms in Hospitals, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 361 (Purdon Supp. 1985); Tests for Newborn Infants, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 621 (Pur-
don 1977); Reporting of Injuries by Firearms or Criminal Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5106 (Purdon 1983); Reporting Incidents of Professional Misconduct Act, Act No. 1985-48,
1985 PA. LEGIS. SERV. 269 (to be codified at 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.806.1).
In order to be accredited, the hospital must also comply with the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 1986 (hereinafter cited as
JCAH), and in the case of Osteopathic Hospitals, the American Osteopathic Association,
ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE AMERICAN OSTEOPATHIC ASSOCIATION 1984 (hereinafter
378
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of technological innovation must pass the scrutiny of an intimidat-
ing and time-consuming array of approval mechanisms.' So-called
medico-moral questions arise with a frequency that makes them
commonplace, but nevertheless deeply troubling.5
It is no wonder many practitioners react to the law and lawyers
angrily. Obviously they are puzzled, frustrated and frightened.
Everything has changed; they seem to have lost control of what
used to be their sacred and familiar territory. In a very short span
of years, the legal system has moved from a posture of benign in-
difference about health matters, to an attitude of active interven-
tion in all aspects of health care delivery.6 Legal developments
cited as A.O.A.).
4. National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §
300k (West 1983), Regulations, 42 C.F.R. §§ 121-124 (1985); Health Care Facilities Act, 35
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 448.101-448.903 (Purdon Supp. 1985), Regulations, 28 PA. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 405.1-405.5 (1985); THE PROPOSED PENNSYLVANIA STATE HEALTH PLAN 1981-1986
(2nd Ed. 1981). A poignant example of the significance of "approval mechanisms" is found
in Statewide Health Coordinating Council v. General Hosps. of Humana, Inc., 280 Ark. 443,
660 S.W.2d 906 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2386 (1984). In this case, Humana applied
for, and was granted, a Certificate of Need (CON) which was necessary to build a 150-bed
community hospital in 1982. Humana began construction of the hospital while three parties
who had originally opposed the CON asked for, and received, a review by an independent
state agency. The agency affirmed the award of the CON and its decision was affirmed by
the circuit court. The Supreme Court of Arkansas, however, found that the grant of the
CON was inconsistent with the state health plan. It thus reversed the award of the CON
and forced Humana to halt construction of the now partially-finished hospital.
5. Health care practitioners and hospital executives must deal with critical life or
death decisions more often than any other segment of the professional world. Medical tech-
nological advances have not only expanded the professional ability to alleviate illness and
disease, but at the same time, those advances have also extended the existence of those with
debilitating or terminal illness. In addition to troubling questions regarding the application
of life-perpetuating technology to terminally ill or permanently comatose patients, there are
equally compelling decisions which must be made concerning withholding treatment or
nourishment from some patients or withdrawing treatment after it has been initiated. Of
course, the matter of choosing the one person who shall receive beneficial, but costly or
limited, therapeutic services is equally troubling. See, e.g., Angell, Cost Containment and
the Physician, 254 J. A.M.A. 1203 (Sept. 6, 1985); F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PA-
TERNALISM AND HEALTH CARE (1982); Citron, Sounding Board, Trustees at the Focal Point,
313 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1223 (Nov. 7, 1985); Special Report, Technology, Financing and
Rationing: Where to From Here in the DRG Era, 17 FED'N OF AMER. HosPs. REV. 12 (May/
June 1984); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Su-
perintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977).
6. Indeed, the legal climate toward hospitals has shifted from total immunity to one of
almost strict liability for all tortious acts committed under its roof. See generally Comment,
The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice of Physi-
cians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385 (1975). Language from the case of Atassi v. Massillon Commu-
nity Hosp., CA-6075 (Ct. App. Stark Cty., July 25, 1983), illustrates the commonplace judi-
cial recognition of hospital liability:
At this point we observe in passing, what must be obvious to all, that the legal profes-
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have required hospital management to institute such things as peer
review and credentialling programs which increasingly control the
professional's practice patterns. This comes about as a conse-
quence of the reality that today the hospital stands at risk for eve-
rything that happens within the institution, including legal respon-
sibility for the acts of the medical practitioners on the so-called
medical staff. In the past, hospitals were not liable for the acts of
staff members because they were considered to be independent
practitioners. Now, under expanding theories of corporate liabil-
ity,7 hospitals are sued for physician-caused adverse patient care
sion generally, and the judiciary specifically, recognize that if hospitals are to be de-
rivatively liable for the negligence of the physicians they allow to practice therein,
they must be given a free hand to choose those whose potential misconduct might
bankrupt them and put them out of business.
Atassi, slip op. at 3.
Cases which have held the hospital liable for the negligence of its staff appointees though
they were intended to be independent contractors include: Walker v. Winchester Memorial
Hosp., 585 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Va. 1984); Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga.
1981); Gregg v. National Medical Health Care Servs., 145 Ariz. 51, 699 P.2d 925 (1985);
Schagrin v. Wilmington Medical Center, 304 A.2d 61 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Garcia v. Tar-
rio, 380 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Holton v. Resurrection Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d
655, 410 N.E.2d 969 (1980); Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985); Wil-
liams v. St. Claire Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Mehlman v. Powell,
281 Md. 247, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977); Grewe v. Mt. Clements General Hosp., 404 Mich. 240,
273 N.W.2d 429 (1978); Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985); Arthur v. St. Peters
Hosp., 169 N.J. Super. 575, 405 A.2d 443 (1979); Reynolds v. Swigert, 102 N.M. 504, 697
P.2d 504 (1984); Hippocrates Mertsaris v. 73rd Corp., 105 A.D.2d 67, 482 N.Y.S.2d 792
(1984); Willoughby v. Wilkins, 65 N.C. App. 626, 310 S.E.2d 90 (1983); Hannola v. City of
Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980); Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., 676
P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Themins v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Board, 54 Or. App.
901, 637 P.2d 155 (1981); Caplan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 287 Pa. Super. 364, 430 A.2d
647 (1980); Simmons v. St. Clair Memorial Hosp., 332 Pa. Super. 444, 481 A.2d 870 (1984);
Edmonds v. Chamberlain Memorial Hosp., 629 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Adamski
v. Tacoma General Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978).
7. The doctrine of hospital corporate negligence was first enunciated in the case of
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
The doctrine basically holds a hospital liable-as a corporate entity-for the actions of the
medical staff when the hospital could, in some way, have prevented injury to a patient
caused by a medical staff appointee. Subsequently, this doctrine has been utilized by the
courts to require hospitals to exercise reasonable care to insure that the physicians ap-
pointed to the hospital's medical staff are competent. (We refer to this process as creden-
tialling). See, e.g., Early v. Bristol Memorial Hosp., 508 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Tenn. 1980);
Storrs v. Lutheran Hosps. and Homes Soc'y of America, Inc., 661 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1983);
Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976); Purcell v.
Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal.
App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982); Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977);
Buckley v. Lovallo, 2 Con. Supp. 579, 481 A.2d 1286 (1984); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v.
Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 236
N.W.2d 543 (1975); Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Moore v. Board of
Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605 (1972); Corletto v. Shore Memo-
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events and they are found liable. In one sense, this change in the
perceived structure of the health delivery system has caused some
individuals to act unprofessionally and to become disruptive, and
an emerging and distinct aspect of hospital responsibility is han-
dling the disruptive health care practitioner.8
The problem of handling the disruptive health care practitioner
is at once complex and pervasive. It is more widespread than most
imagine. It involves social, collegial, clinical and legal aspects in a
complicated human calculus that defies simple solution. The prob-
lem exists in large and small hospitals, in rural and urban settings,
in teaching institutions and community health centers.
In an earlier time, hospitals and medical organizations accepted,
or at least tolerated, disruptive behavior for a variety of reasons.0
Today, accepting or tolerating such behavior is increasingly diffi-
rial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975); Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp., 65 A.D.2d
388, 411 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1978); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391, petition
denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d 621 (1980); Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d
61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980); Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398 (1975); Pedroza
v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226, 677 P.2d 166 (1984); Johnson v. Misericordia Community
Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
8. The emphasis of this article is on physicians and dentists. However, the term health
care professional is more accurate because nurse practitioners, psychologists, podiatrists and
similar health care professionals other than physicians are subject to the same stresses and
pressures of the hospital environment and act disruptively. Moreover, medical staff appoint-
ment and clinical privileges are being opened to a variety of health care professionals. See,
e.g., JCAH, supra note 3, at 10.1.1.1; CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1316 (West 1977) and
§ 1316.5 (West 1980); See also D.C. CoDE ANN § 32-1307(c) (1985) which provides as follows:
No provision of District of Columbia law, institutional or staff bylaw of a facility or
agency, rule, regulation, or practice shall prohibit qualified certified registered nurse
anesthetists, certified nurse-midwives, certified nurse practitioners, podiatrists, or
psychologists from being accorded clinical privileges and appointed to all categories
of staff membership at those facilities and agencies that offer the kinds of services
that can be performed by either members of these health professions or physicians.
As used in this subsection, the word 'certified' denotes certification by the following
organizations: For nurse practitioners, the American Nurses' Association, the Na-
tional Association of Pediatric Nurse Associates and Practitioners, or the NAACOG
Certification Corporation [Nurses Association of the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists]; and for nurse-midwives, the American College of Nurse-
Midwives. Use of the words 'certified registered' for nurse anesthetists denotes certifi-
cation by the Council on Certification of the American Association of Nurse Anesthe-
tists or recertification by the Council of Recertification of the American Association
of Nurse Anesthetists. The Mayor may add to this list acceptable certifying organiza-
tions through rules adopted under § 32-1304. These certification requirements shall
control in the absence of specialty licensing for these health professionals.
9. Physicians were initially loath to become involved in what were considered to be the
private problems of their colleagues. Reasons for this reluctance ranged from "there but for
the grace of God go I," to fears of litigation. See generally Hirsh, The Medical-Legal Impli-
cations of the Errant or "Sick" Physician, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 377 (1976).
Duquesne Law Review
cult, at least in the hospital setting, because the clear trend of the
law is to hold the hospital-as a corporate entity-accountable for
all activity which occurs within its walls. It is clear that a hospital
is now at risk for all professional activity which takes place under
its jurisdiction. 10 Some courts have extended this risk to the medi-
cal staff leadership1 and a few have suggested that the entire hos-
pital medical staff may be subject to liability under certain circum-
stances.12 Thus, contrary to an earlier time when it was very much
accepted, there is a low level of tolerance for disruptive behavior
today.
This article will explore several issues relating to the disruptive
health care practitioner in the hospital context. Initially, "disrup-
tive behavior" will be defined. After discussing the medical staff
appointment process and the importance of well-drafted medical
staff bylaws, we will then examine how and under what circum-
stances hospital management can act in handling the disruptive
practitioner. The approach the hospital takes may depend on
whether the practitioner is making an application for initial ap-
pointment, is being considered for reappointment, or is in the mid-
dle of his term of appointment. Underlying this discussion is the
critical issue of balancing the practitioner's interests and those of
the institution. This will lead us to a consideration of whether dis-
ruptive behavior alone, without evidence of a direct adverse impact
on either patient care or hospital functions, is sufficient to warrant
a practitioner's exclusion from the hospital. The article will con-
clude with a section on due process concerns and, what is ex-
tremely important, a section on the range of hospital responses
short of invoking formal due process procedures.
It is our conclusion that the clear trend of the cases supports the
view that a hospital may deny initial appointment, terminate an
appointed practitioner or deny reappointment, solely on the basis
of the practitioner's disruptive behavior. It is our view that the
trend is appropriate and justified. We also are of the opinion that
medical and administrative hospital leadership must be able to
10. See supra notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text.
11. Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1979); Simmons
v. St. Clair Memorial Hosp., 332 Pa. Super. 444, 481 A.2d 870 (1984); Wilson v. McCarthy,
57 A.D.2d 617, 393 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1977).
12. Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777
(1985); Bhatt v. Uniontown Hosp., C.A. No. 83-2455 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1984); Corleto v.
Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975). See also Horty and Mul-
holland, The Legal Status of the Hospital Medical Staff, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 485 (1978).
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employ a range of administrative strategies to deal rapidly and ef-
fectively with the disruptive practitioner short of a structured due
process hearing. We believe nonetheless, that fundamental due
process considerations generally apply and that practitioners must
be accorded a full and fair opportunity to defend themselves.
II. DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR DEFINED
The disruptive practitioner is by definition, contentious, threat-
ening, unreachable, insulting and frequently litigious. He will not,
or cannot, play by the rules, nor is he able to relate to or work well
with others.' 3 The disruptive health care practitioner can be one
who has recently entered into practice or an individual with years
of experience. He, or she, can be white or black, native or foreign
born, a specialist or general practitioner, educated in this country
or foreign trained. This practitioner often falls within the classifi-
cation of the impaired or sick physician,' in that the underlying
reason for the practitioner's abusive conduct may be a mental or
emotional problem.15 However, that is not always the case. Some-
times the person is simply a disruptive or abrasive human being.
The manifestation of disruptive behavior sometimes takes bi-
13. See, e.g., Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564 (1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276,
281 A.2d 589 (1971); Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554
(1924), aff'd mem., 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925).
14. See generally Special Report, 82 MICHIGAN MEDICINE 278-294 (1982); A.M.A.
Council on Mental Health, The Sick Physician, 223 J. A.M.A. 684 (Feb. 1973); Berman,
Legal Mechanisms for Dealing with the Disabled Physician in Maryland, 25 MD. ST. MED.
J. 41 (Feb. 1976); Canavan, Advocacy, 81 JOURNAL OF MEDICAL SOC'v OF N.J. 140 (Feb. 1984);
Gordon, Growing Pressure to Act Against Incompetent Doctors, PHYSICIAN'S MANAGEMENT
56 (May 1975); Hirsh, The Medical-Legal Implications of the Errant or Sick Physician,
MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 377 (1976); Martindale, Subtle Enablers, 80 JOURNAL OF THE ARI.
MEDICAL Soc'Y 531 (1984); Modlin, The Disabled Physician, 76 J. KAN. MED. Soc'v 295
(1975); Niven, Hurt, Morse & Swenson, Alcoholism in Physicians, 59 MAYO CLINIC PRO-
CEEDINGS 12 (1984); Physician's Committee, Special Report, 75 N.Y.S. J. MED. 420 (1975);
Rensberger, The Doctors Who Need the Care of Other Doctors, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1977, §
4 at 8, col. 3; Scheiber, A Comprehensive Statewide Approach to the Sick Doctor, 32 ARiz.
MED. 933 (1975); Shapiro, Pinsker & Shaler, The Mentally Ill Physician as Practitioner,
232 J. A.M.A. 725 (1975); Silver, The Medical Insurance Disease, 222 NATION 366 (1976);
Talbott, Holderfield, Shoemaker & Atkins, The Disabled Doctors Plan for Georgia, 65 J.
MED. ASS'N GA. 71 (Mar. 1976); Tanous, The Oasis Syndrome: The Physicians Need for
Refuge, 28 AMERICAN FAMILY PHYSICIAN 121 (Oct.-Dec. 1983); Waring, Psychiatric Illness in
Physicians; A Review, 15 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 519 (1974). Note, New Treatment for
Disabled Physicians: Proposed Amendments to the Medical Practices Act of 1977, 42 ALB.
L. REV. 32 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Don v. Okmulgee Memorial Hosp., 443 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1971); Even v.
Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n., 629 P.2d 1100 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Rao v. Auburn General
Hosp., 19 Wash. App. 124, 573 P.2d 834 (1978).
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zarre forms."0 The disruptive practitioner is often clinically compe-
tent. Indeed, he will believe himself to be more competent than
others on the medical staff. It is not uncommon to find that a dis-
ruptive practitioner is, in fact, highly intelligent, clinically supe-
rior, even medically outstanding. 17 However, the reason for his dis-
ruptiveness, his inability to get along with others, sometimes
affects his clinical judgment. He is totally convinced that he is
right. Those who would question him or seek to have him behave
differently, whether they are colleagues or not, are seen to be moti-
vated by ignorance, stupidity, jealousy or a desire to destroy him
as an economic competitor. They are also believed to be weak and
vulnerable. In fact, the objects of his unacceptable behavior are
most frequently those who, by virtue of their positions, are weak
and vulnerable. He may not openly take on the strong and prestig-
ious, but rather seek to undermine and intimidate those who can
neither avoid him nor fight back. For these reasons, and regardless
of what may cause him to act as he does, he is a formidable person.
He is not, of course, to be confused with the physician who is
merely "different." Those who express unorthodox opinions, dis-
play unusual tastes or adopt alternative life-styles may well be out
of step with the majority of the medical staff, hospital manage-
ment or the board. Nevertheless, as long as they discharge their
responsibilities to the hospital and to their patients and are not
fomenting trouble, the hospital has a positive obligation to treat
them with the same degree of tolerance and acceptance it affords
the "regulars. '" Only when personal idiosyncrasies, as expressed
16. In Leonard v. Board of Directors of Prowers County Hosp. Dist., 673 P.2d 1019
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983), the plaintiff, in response to the hospital board's request for more open
communications, sent a memorandum to the hospital attorney which included a depiction of
"a set of lips on the posterior of a nude figure." Id. at 1021.
17. "Mere intellectual power and scientific achievement without uprightness of charac-
ter may be more harmful than ignorance. Highly trained intelligence combined with disre-
gard of the fundamental virtues is a menace." Lawrence v. Bairy, 239 Mass. 424, 429, 132
N.E. 174, 176 (1921). For "disruptive physician" cases in which the court specifically made
note of the fact that the physician's competence was not at issue, see, e.g., Meridith v. Allen
County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n., 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968); Robbins v. Ong, 452 F.
Supp. 110 (S.D. Ga. 1978); McMillan v. Anchorage Community Hosp., 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska
1982); Even v. Longmont United Hosp. Assn., 629 P.2d 1100 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Spencer
v. Children's Hosp., 419 So. 2d 1307 (La. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd. on other grounds, 432 So. 2d
823 (La. 1983); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589 (1971);
Grodjesk v. Jersey City Medical Center, 135 N.J. Super. 393, 343 A.2d 489 (1975); Siegel v.
St. Vincent Charity Hosp. and Health Center, No. 79376 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Oct. 31,
1985); Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398 (1975).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,151 (M.D. Fla. 1981) and In re Forbes Health System Medical Staff, 94 F.T.C. 1042
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in words or deeds, begin to affect the ability of others to get their
jobs done, or impinge on their right to go about their own business
free of burdensome harassment, or when such idiosyncrasies begin
to interfere with the practitioner's ability to perform well profes-
sionally, is action by the hospital indicated.
The hospital's decision whether to take action, however, is not
an easy one to make and the hospital is at risk whatever action it
takes. If it does nothing in the face of behavior that is disruptive,
its inaction can cause serious morale problems, even to the extent
of losing its employees and causing the rest of the medical staff to
become disaffected. The hospital literally can, by its inaction, allow
its effectiveness to be destroyed. On the other hand, if the hospital
acts against a practitioner who is merely "different," it opens itself
to the possibility of injunctive action and money damages.19
The courts have had to deal with a variety of types of disruptive
behavior in the hospital setting. The following examples are illus-
trative: attacks levelled at other medical staff appointees which are
personal and irrelevant, or go beyond the bounds of fair profes-
sional comment;20 impertinent and inappropriate comments writ-
(1979) (both cases involved discrimination against those physicians who participated in a
"Health Maintenance Organization"); In the Matter of Sherman A. Hope, 98 F.T.C. 58
(1981) (five established physicians required to cease their coercion activities regarding hos-
pital policy to recruit "new" physicians to the area); Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical
Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974) (conspiracy and discrimination against
physician because he was an early proponent of the Medicare program). Compare Cipriotti
v. Board of Directors of Northridge Hosp. Found. Medical Center, 147 Cal. App. 3d 144, 196
Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983) (summary suspension proper here where physician condoned the use
of controlled drugs at parties at his residence and also displayed a hashish pipe and con-
doned the use of dangerous drugs in the presence of employees and a patient).
19. See, e.g., McElhinney v. William Booth Memorial Hosp., 544 S.W.2d 216 (Ky.
1977), discussed infra notes 23, 90-94 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (doctor
tried to convince the parents of a patient to change their decision of using another physi-
cian, instead of himself, to operate on their daughter, and exhibited a general inability to
cooperate with other surgeons and medical staff appointees); Hoberman v. Lock Haven
Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 1178 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (uncontrolled emotional outbursts, coercion and
harassment of other doctors who did not refer all of their cases to him); McMillan v.
Anchorage Community Hosp., 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982) (series of problems and incidents
occurring over a two year period between Dr. McMillan and other staff physicians, the nurs-
ing staff, a nurse anesthetist and the relatives of several patients); Dunbar v. Hosp. Auth. of
Gwinnett County, 227 Ga. 534, 182 S.E.2d 89 (1971) (doctor continuously stated he was
going to change everything in the hospital and made general derogatory statements with
respect to other professionals); Silver v. The Queen's Hosp., 63 Hawaii 430, 629 P.2d 1116
(1981) (doctor treated and billed a patient without the knowledge of the physician who
admitted her for treatment; doctor further did not hesitate to violate the rules and regula-
tions of those hospitals where he was appointed; and, in the hearings that followed the de-
nial of his appointment at Queen's Hospital, he charged two doctors with subornation of
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ten (or "cute" illustrations drawn) in patient medical records, or
other official documents, impugning the quality of care in the hos-
pital, or attacking particular practitioners, nurses or hospital pol-
icy;21 and sexual harassment of nurses, other hospital employees or
patients.22
Disruptive behavior may also manifest itself as non-constructive
criticism, addressed to its recipient in such a way as to intimidate,
undermine confidence, belittle, or impute stupidity, bad motives or
incompetence. The content of the criticism may ostensibly express
concern for the patient, implying thereby lesser standards on the
part of the person criticized or, in fact, of the hospital itself. Such
criticism can be very disarming. To attempt to refute it is to ap-
pear to disagree with the standard or, worse, to acknowledge that a
lesser standard is acceptable. Furthermore, the practitioner him-
self is able to disguise his real motive, which is to hurt, disrupt and
harass, behind high-sounding words and his "right" to say
whatever he wants in the interest of better patient care.23
perjury, alleged that the hospital condoned medical malpractice, and alleged that insurance
companies told the board of directors which physicians should be admitted to the staff);
Yarnell v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Service, Inc., - Ind. App. -, 446 N.E.2d 359
(1983) (doctor was threatening and abusive to other medical staff appointees and was gener-
ally disruptive to hospital procedures); Anderson v. Trustees of Caro Community Hosp., 10
Mich. App. 348, 159 N.W.2d 347 (1968) (evidence against Dr. Anderson was "replete with
examples of vilification, screaming and profanity"); Thompson v. Grays Harbor Community
Hosp., 36 Wash. App. 300, 675 P.2d 239 (1983) (doctor referred to another physician as "a
butcher").
21. See, e.g., Cipriotti, 196 Cal. Rptr. 367 (placed inappropriate and disrespectful
comments on a patient's chart); Leonard v. Board of Directors of Prowers County Hosp.
Dist., 673 P.2d 1019 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (doctor drew a set of lips on posterior of nude
figure); Kiracofe v. Reid Memorial Hosp., - Ind. App. -, 461 N.E.2d 1134 (1984) (en-
tered inappropriate and defamatory statements in medical records).
22. See, e.g., Belanoff v. Grayson, 98 A.D.2d 353, 471 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1984); Boiling v.
Baker, 671 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App. 1984). See also Horty, Sexual Harassment, What to do
About It, AcTiON-KIT FOR HOSPITAL LAW (July 1981); Horty, Sexual Harassment, HOSPITAL
LAW Ch. 2 § 4 (July 1985); Yollick and Hirsh, Sexual Harassment in the Hospital Work-
place: It Involves Everyone and It Ain't Legal, MED. TIAL TECH. Q. 442 (1984); Annot., 15
A.L.R. 3rd 1179 (1967).
23. See, e.g., McElhinney, 544 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1977). In this case, the court charac-
terized the allegedly disruptive physician as an especially competent, dedicated and busy
surgeon who had incurred the wrath of the hospital's administration when he voiced his
objections to what he perceived to be hospital-condoned substandard patient care. However,
in a subsequent federal antitrust suit which was based upon his staff termination, McElhin-
ney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ky. 1982), it was revealed that the
real reason behind Dr. McElhinney's termination was his disruptive conduct. "[H]e was a
troublemaker. It appears that each defendant had a confrontation with plaintiff in which
vulgarities, religious or ethnic slurs were made by plaintiff. The evidence also shows that
defendants were concerned with plaintiff simultaneously attempting to cover-up on his own
errors while making their errors public." Id. at 135. See also Buckner v. Lower Florida Keys
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Other examples include: refusal to accept medical staff assign-
ments or to participate in committee or departmental affairs on
anything but his own terms or to do so in a disruptive manner;
2
imposing idiosyncratic requirements on the nursing staff which
have nothing to do with better patient care but serve only to bur-
den the nurses with special techniques and procedures;25 rude or
abusive conduct to nurses or other hospital employees; 26 abusive
Hosp. Dist., 403 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition for rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 463
(Fla. 1982). The court characterized plaintiff as one who "pontifically lauded himself, while
castigating the medical community in which he practiced with vitriolic and intemperate re-
marks." Id. at 1027.
24. Harris v. Group Health Ass'n, 662 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (pattern of reporting
to work late, failure to visit satellite laboratories, refusal to work weekends); Laje v. R. E.
Thomason Gen. Hosp., 564 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1977) (doctor's history replete with instances
of insubordination); Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n., 397 F.2d 33
(6th Cir. 1968) (physician refused to handle any emergency cases); Cipriotti, 196 Cal. Rptr.
367 (failure of doctor to attend staffing conferences); Dunbar v. Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett
County, 227 Ga. 534, 182 S.E.2d 89 (1971) (violated restrictions imposed on temporary privi-
leges); Glass v. Doctors Hosp., 213 Md. 44, 131 A.2d 254 (1957) (doctor's attempt "to take
control" of hospital described as follows: "[Blehind this skeletal history looms conflicts of
personality and battles for administrative control of the hospital. ... Id. at 51, 131 A.2d
at 257); Grodjesk v. Jersey City Medical Center, 135 N.J. Super. 393, 343 A.2d 489 (1975)
(disharmony, mistrust and lack of cooperation between two oral surgeons and the director of
the department of dentistry); Theissen v. Watonga Municipal Hosp. Board, 550 P.2d 938
(Okla. 1976) (doctor did not keep his "promises" to abide by hospital rules and failed to
carry out medical staff duties in a proper, professional and dependable manner); Clair v.
Centre Community Hosp., 317 Pa. Super. 25, 463 A.2d 1065 (1983) (physician refused to
treat indigent patients); Ritter v. Board of Comm'rs. of Adams County Public Hosp. Dist.
No. 1, 96 Wash. 2d 503, 637 P.2d 940 (1981) (repeated performance of surgery in violation of
hospital rules, chart delinquencies and failure to cooperate with administration and staff);
Rao v. Auburn General Hosp., 19 Wash. App. 124, 573 P.2d 834 (1978) (refusal to abide by
medical staff bylaws).
25. See, e.g., Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (ordered
intensive care nursing staff not to permit any hospital resident to order anything for his
patient without his approval); Ladenheim v. Union County Hosp., 76 Ill. App. 3d 90, 394
N.E.2d 770 (1979) (doctor left orders that no nurse was to institute cardiopulmonary resus-
citation on any of his patients without his permission).
26. See, e.g., Even v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 629 P.2d 1100 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981) (doctor's uncontrolled temper and actions intimidated those working with him and
caused strong hostilities); Dunbar v. Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County, 227 Ga. 534, 182
S.E.2d 89 (1971) (attitude toward and communication with nursing staff created friction);
Kiracofe v. Reid Memorial Hosp.,'-- Ind. App. -, 461 N.E.2d 1134 (1984) (doctor refused
to explain orders and exhibited abusive behavior toward nurses); Spencer v. Children's
Hosp., 419 So. 2d 1307 (La. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 432 So. 2d 823 (La.
1983) (35% of the nursing staff had threatened to resign due to Dr. Spencer's abusive treat-
ment); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589 (1971) (doctor
acted in a manner that was disruptive to the hospital's nursing and administrative staff);
Ponca City Hosp. v. Murphree, 545 P.2d 738 (Okla. 1976) (hospital personnel had extreme
difficulty in working with Dr. Murphree); Thompson v. Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 36
Wash. App. 300, 675 P.2d 239 (1983) (physician difficult in her behavior to hospital employ-
ees and exhibited displays of temper). See also supra note 20; Eidelson v. Archer, 645 P.2d
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behavior to patients, yelling at them or refusing to listen to their
legitimate questions and requests;2 7 negative comments to patients
about other physicians, nurses, or treatment being given the pa-
tient or the operation of the hospital;2" threats or physical assaults
on physicians, employees or
others on hospital property.2 9
When any one, or a combination, of such acts or words is re-
peated, the practitioner has stepped across the line which divides
the occasional over-reaction to stress from a course of behavior in-
imical to the proper operation of the hospital. Many of the court
decisions discussed in this article illustrate the particular kinds of
behavior that have been held to be a reasonable basis upon which a
hospital may take action. Before we can reach the question of
when and in what ways the hospital can act, some discussion of the
medical staff appointment process and the important role played
by both corporate and medical staff bylaws is necessary.
III. HOSPITAL MEDICAL STAFF APPOINTMENT
In order to discuss this subject appropriately, it is first necessary
to explore the nature of the unique relationship between the health
care practitioner and the hospital. This relationship has evolved
significantly in the recent past due to several-often compet-
ing-pressures on practitioners and hospitals.30 Today, the hospi-
171 (Alaska 1982); Akopiantz v. Board of County Comm'rs of Otero County, 65 N.M. 125,
333 P.2d 611 (1959); Ritter v. Board of Comm'rs. of Adams County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1,
96 Wash. 2d 503, 637 P.2d 940 (1981) (en banc).
27. A recent case which poignantly illustrates such conduct is Greer v. Medders, -
Ga. -, 336 S.E.2d 328 (1985). In Greer, a physician made the following statements to a
post-operative patient and his wife: "I don't have to be your damn doctor" and "If your
smart ass wife would keep her mouth shut things wouldn't be so bad." Id. at 329. See also
Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971);
Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982); McMillan v. Anchorage
Community Hosp., 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982); Eidelson v. Archer, 645 P.2d 171 (Alaska
1982); Pick v. Santa Ana-Tustin Community Hosp., 130 Cal. App. 3d 970, 182 Cal. Rptr. 85
(1982).
28. See, e.g., Silver v. Queen's Memorial Hosp., 63 Hawaii 430, 629 P.2d 1116 (1981)
(whole scenario revolving around treatment and billing of a physician's patient without the
attending physician's knowledge); Siegal v. St. Vincent Charity Hosp. and Health Center,
No. 79376 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Oct. 31, 1985) (physician made negative statements
about the hospital to a patient who was also a hospital employee); Thompson v. Grays Har-
bor Community Hosp., 36 Wash. App. 300, 675 P.2d 239 (1983) (referred to another physi-
cian as "a butcher").
29. See, e.g., Robbins v. Ong, 452 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
30. For a discussion of the factors which have contributed to these competing pres-
sures, see Springer, The Conflicting Legal Pressures on the Modern Hospital, 14 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 82 (1983); see also P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
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tal medical staff consists primarily of physicians and dentists, but
other practitioners, especially podiatrists, nurse anesthetists and
clinical psychologists, are being included with growing frequency.
31
Only persons who have been appointed to the hospital's medical
staff and who have been granted clinical privileges32 are authorized
to admit or treat patients in the hospital. Most importantly, medi-
cal staff appointment is a privilege, not a right,33 and no person has
(1982). For a related view, see R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1971).
31. See supra note 8. For several recent cases which evidence this evolution in the
composition of the medical staff, see, e.g., Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 772 F.2d 1467 (9th
Cir. 1985) (nurse anesthetist permitted to bring an action alleging that hospital's policy of
allowing only M.D. anesthesiolgists to perform anesthesia services in the hospital's operating
rooms violated federal antitrust laws); Dooley v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 11 Ohio St. 3d
216, 465 N.E.2d 58 (1984) (podiatrist successfully sued and was granted clinical privileges);
compare Fort Hamilton-Hughes Memorial Hosp. Center v. Southard, 12 Ohio St. 3d 263,
466 N.E.2d 903 (1984) (court construed same statute as in Dooley but chiropractor was
denied medical staff membership). See also COMMENTS OF THE BOSTON REGIONAL OFFICE OF
THE F.T.C. (Dec. 14, 1984) (position paper sent to the Board of Registration in Medicine of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts which stated that, in the hospital setting, competition
between nurse anesthetists and M.D. anesthesiologists for anesthesia services should be con-
doned and encouraged). See generally Horty, Non-Physician Practitioners, HOSPITAL LAW
(Oct. 1985).
32. Appointment to a hospital's medical staff is actually a two step process: (a) ap-
pointment to the staff which is granted by a hospital's governing board only after a practi-
tioner is able to satisfy certain specific criteria relating to licensure, education, training,
background, experience, health, ethics etc.; see JCAH, supra note 3, at 10.1.2; Medicare
Conditions of Participation, 42 C.F.R. § 405.1021(e)(1) (1983); and (b) the assignment of
specific clinical privileges which the staff appointee has demonstrated he is currently compe-
tent to perform; see JCAH, supra note 3, at 10.4; Medicare Conditions of Participation, 42
C.F.R. § 405.1021(e)(3) (1983). Courts often fall to make this distinction and only serve to
confuse the issue by making reference to "staff privileges."
33. A physician has no constitutional right to practice medicine in a public hospital.
See, e.g., Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927); Klinge v. Lutheran Charities
Ass'n. of St. Louis, 523 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1975); Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th
Cir. 1971); Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968); Meredith v.
Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n., 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968); Birnbaum v.
Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2nd Cir. 1966); Duffield v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n. of Charleston, 361
F. Supp. 398 (S.D. W. Va. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974).
"The ultimate decision as to whether a particular physician ought to enjoy staff-privileges
at a hospital should be made by persons having the expertise necessary to make an intelli-
gent decision, and not by judges. It is probably for such reason that '[h]ospital boards and
officers are vested with a large measure of management discretion in the selection of mem-
bers of the medical staff of a hospital.'" Early v. Bristol Memorial Hosp., Inc., 508 F. Supp.
35, 38 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). See also Moore v. Andalusia Hosp., Inc., 284 Ala. 259, 224 So. 2d
617 (1969); Even v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 629 P.2d 1100 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981);
Hoffman v. Garden City Hospital-Osteopathic, 115 Mich. App. 773, 321 N.W.2d 810 (1982);
Tigua Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Feuerberg, 645 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983).
However, the modern trend appears to be in the direction of those jurisdictions which
permit judicial review in order to ensure that the exclusion was in compliance with the
hospital's medical staff bylaws and was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. See Feld-
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a right to be granted specific clinical privileges once appointed."'
The appointment to a medical staff is made by the governing
body of the hospital, almost always on the recommendation of the
medical staff executive committee after an evaluation of the appli-
cant practitioner's background, education, training, experience,
ethics, health status, current competence and other information
obtained from the practitioner and external sources.3 5 The evalua-
man v. St. Mary's Hosp. and Health Center, 126 Ariz. 262, 614 P.2d 343 (1980); Avol v.
Hawthorne Community Hosp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 101, 184 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1982); Dance v.
North Broward Hosp. Dist., 420 So. 2d 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Silver v. Castle Me-
morial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564 (1972); McElhinney v. William Booth Memorial
Hosp., 544 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1976); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276,
281 A.2d 589, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389,
192 A.2d 817 (1963); Kelly v. St. Vincent Hosp., 102 N.M. 201, 692 P.2d 1350 (1984); Fritz v.
Huntington Hosp., 39 N.Y.2d 339, 348 N.E.2d 547 (1976); Cameron v. New Hanover Memo-
rial Hosp., Inc., 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901 (1982); Gotsis v. Lorain Community
Hosp., 46 Ohio App. 2d 8, 345 N.E.2d 641 (1974); Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d
1398 (1975); Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966). See generally
Ey, Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination of, or Refusal to Grant, Hospital Privileges,
2 CAUSES OF ACTION 597 (1983); Annot., 37 A.L.R. 3d 645 (1971).
Of even greater importance is the recent application of the federal antitrust laws to deci-
sions involving medical staff appointments and clinical privileges. See, e.g., Weiss v. York
Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985); Robinson v.
Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 971 (1982). See also Miles & Philp, Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust Net: An
Overview, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (1986); Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and
Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1982).
34. "The mere fact that a person is admitted or licensed to practice his profession
does not justify any inference beyond the conclusion that he has met the minimum require-
ments and possesses the minimum qualifications for that purpose .... Moreover not all
professional men have a personality that enables them to work in harmony with others, and
to inspire confidence in their fellows and in patients. These factors are of importance and
here, too, there is room for selection." Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp.
59, 64 (D.D.C. 1963). See also Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398 (1975); JCAH,
supra note 3. at 10.4.1.2.
35. Other acceptable medical staff appointment criteria include: (a) location within
the geographic service area of the hospital as defined by the governing board, see 42 C.F.R. §
405.1021(h)(2); JCAH, supra note 3, 10.1.2.3.1.2.3.4 and 10.4.2.2.3.4; Sosa v. Board of Man-
agers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971); Kennedy v. St. Joseph
Memorial Hosp. of Kokomo Indiana Inc., - Ind. App. -, 482 N.E.2d 268 (1985); Berman
v. Valley Hosp., 196 N.J. Super. 359, 482 A.2d 944 (1984); compare Sams v. Ohio Valley
Gen. Hosp. Ass'n., 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); (b) possession of a current valid professional
liability insurance policy in coverage amounts satisfactory to the hospital, see JCAH, supra
note 3, 10.1.2.3.1.2.3.3 and 10.4.2.2.3.3; Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Pollock v. Methodist Hosp., 392 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. La. 1975);
Holmes v. Hoemako Hosp., 117 Ariz 403, 573 P.2d 477 (1977); Wilkinson v. Madera Commu-
nity Hosp., 144 Cal. App. 3d 436, 192 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1983); Maxey v. Martin Memorial
Hosp. Ass'n., Inc., No. 82-330-CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 24, 1983), aff'd, 449 So. 2d 275 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Renforth v. Fayette Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 178 Ind. App. 475, 383
N.E.2d 368 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930 (1979); Chalasani v. Neuman, 97 A.D.2d 806,
468 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1983); compare State of Kansas ex rel Schneider v. Liggett, 223 Kan. 610,
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tion is performed by the medical staff leadership structure, consist-
ing of the chiefs of clinical divisions in the hospital, the credentials
committee and the executive committee. Periodic reappointment
occurs in much the same fashion, except that the data upon which
the executive committee makes its recommendation to the gov-
erning board come primarily from internal sources, because the
practitioner should have established, by reappointment time, a
"track record" in the hospital."6 It will be remembered that the
vast majority of practitioners on medical staffs are independent
entrepreneurs-not employees of the hospital. Moreover, the hos-
pital appointment, while a privilege, is nonetheless an important
asset to the practitioner. Many practitioners seek to obtain as
many hospital medical appointments as possible,37 but this prac-
tice is growing increasingly difficult because of economic, competi-
tive, technological and other constraints. Indeed, some hospital
576 P.2d 221 (1978); (c) certification by the appropriate medical specialty board, unless such
requirement is waived by the hospital governing body after considering the special compe-
tence and experience of the applicant, see JCAH, supra note 3, 10.4.2.7.3.2; Sarasota County
Pub. Hosp. Bd. v. Shahawy, 408 So. 2d 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); and (d) the ability to
document their background, experience and demonstrated clinical ability, see JCAH, supra
note 3, at 10.4.2.5. See generally Horty, Criteria for Initial Appointment, MEDICAL STAFF
LAW MANUAL (1984).
36. See JCAH, supra note 3, at 10.5; A.O.A., supra note 3, at 18; Medicare Conditions
of Participation, 42 C.F.R. § 405.1021(e)(3) (1983).
37. For example, in Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d
431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1962), Dr. Rosner had privileges in approximately forty hospitals.
Today, however, hospitals have been given discretion by the courts to institute "medical
staff development policies" which will have the affect of limiting appointments to the medi-
cal staff for a specified period of time. If the policy is properly designed and reasonably
related to patient care it will be upheld. See Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D.
Pa. 1981), aff'd., 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Guerrero v.
Burlington County Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 360 A.2d 334 (1976); Forcina v. Hacken-
sack Medical Center, No. C-1801-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 1984); Davis v. Morristown
Memorial Hosp., 106 N.J. Super. 33, 254 A.2d 125 (1969); JCAH, supra note 3, 10.4.2.2.3.1;
but compare Walsky v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 145 N.J. Super. 393, 367 A.2d 1204 (1976).
See also Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 CB 202, which sets forth a four part test to be used in
determining whether a hospital qualifies for an exemption from federal income tax under
section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as an organization described in section
501(c)(3) thereof. The third prong of this four part test is as follows:
It (the hospital) must not restrict the use of its facilities to a particular group of
physicians and surgeons, such as a medical partnership or association, to the exclu-
sion of all other qualified doctors . . . . It is recognized, however, that in the opera-
tion of a hospital there must of necessity be some discretionary authority in the man-
agement to approve the qualifications of those applying for the use of the medical
facilities. The size and nature of facilities may also make it necessary to impose
limitations on the extent to which they may be made available to all reputable and
competent physicians in the area.
Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
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governing bodies have undertaken to institute medical staff devel-
opment policies in order to obtain the most appropriate kinds of
practitioners who will admit a favorable "patient mix" for the hos-
pital's stability and survival.3 8 Obviously, neither disruptive behav-
ior nor inability to get along with others is likely to be a favored
behavioral characteristic in terms of appointment to a medical
staff that may be limited in numbers of general practitioners or
specialists. Indeed, because of the increasing emphasis on the team
approach in health care delivery, along with the decided trend to-
ward hospital-practitioner and practitioner-practitioner joint ven-
tures, the ability to cooperate with others is an important attribute
of a health care professional.39
The appointment/reappointment process is defined by law, gen-
erally, in the form of hospital licensing regulations 0 and national
hospital standards,4 and by the hospital and medical staff by-
laws.42 From all of these sources and a growing body of case law,
38. In Forcina v. Hackensack Medical Center, supra note 37, the Medical Center's Ad
Hoc Blue Ribbon Committee on staffing stated:
Staffing has to depend on a decision as to what kind of hospital this is to be.
To survive and improve as an institution, we should consider the policy that depart-
ment directors are to recruit carefully and earnestly instead of waiting for applicants
to file. This includes the needs for areas to be developed to meet the needs of a
changing and aging community. Recruiting is needed to meet the needs of a teaching
hospital, and we have to concentrate on developing excellence in teaching and skills
in established areas and to develop services that are needed. This would be competi-
tive with other hospitals rather than with the existing staff.
Id. at 24. The court then found that the hospital's decision which denied appointment to
Dr. Forcina "was related to the Hospital's policy of shifting from a normal community hos-
pital to a teaching hospital and regional center, which is both in the interest of the commu-
nity and the hospital based on this record." Id at 27. See also Burik and Duvall, Hospital
Cost Accounting: Strategic Considerations, 15 HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 19
(Feb. 1985); Caper and Zubkof, Managing Medical Costs through Small Area Analysis,
BUSINESS AND HEALTH (Sept. 1984); Plomann, Bisbee and Esmond, Use of Case Mix Infor-
mation in Hospital Management: An Overview and Case Study, 14 HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 28 (Oct. 1984); Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Pro-
posal for Action, 3 HEALTH AFFAIRS 6 (Summer 1984).
39. STARR, supra note 30, at 26.
40. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE 1OD-28.58 (1984); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, §
405.1023(d) (1977); 28 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 107.5 (Shepards 1983); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 248-
18-030 (1983).
41. See supra notes 35 & 36.
42. The hospital governing body is charged with the responsibility of adopting the
hospital's corporate bylaws, see JCAH, supra note 3, at 4.1.1; A.O.A., supra note 3, at 8; 42
C.F.R. § 405.1021(a) (1983). The governing body also approves the hospital's medical staff
bylaws, see JCAH, supra note 3, at 4.1.18.1 and 10.2.1; A.O.A., supra note 3, at 15; 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.1023 (1983). This dual system of bylaws is an anachronism of the past when the medi-
cal staff was dominant within the hospital. While this view of the medical staff is no longer
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the clear fact emerges that the hospital, acting through its gov-
erning body, must wisely and carefully select the medical staff.
The failure to do so may lead to liability.' Similarly, the failure to
appropriately grant clinical privileges will also lead to hospital lia-
bility.4 The appointment and clinical privileges decision is a most
serious one with very important consequences to the hospital, to
other practitioners, and, most assuredly, to patients.
Interestingly, some courts have recognized the powerful effect a
medical staff appointment may have not only on hospital person-
nel and the health care community, but also on the general pub-
lic.' 5 Although the Supreme Court of Washington in Pedroza v.
Bryant,46 denied hospital liability for the negligence of a staff ap-
pointee in his private office, the court did accept the idea that the
hospital, by its appointment, makes a public statement about the
practitioner's qualifications. If it knows or learns of something be-
cause of that relationship, it may have a duty to act even when the
practitioner is performing services to his private patients in his
private office.' 7
From this brief discussion it should be clear that the hospital
appointment and reappointment decision is significant. It carries
with it certain legal and ethical implications. The hospital is at risk
for its failure to properly certify practitioners' credentials.
IV. LAYING A GOOD FOUNDATION: BYLAWS
Before addressing bylaws, it is important to note that hospitals
are like all other corporations. The ultimate responsibility for the
corporation's conduct rests with the governing board. As a result, a
hospital governing board has the implicit corporate authority to
act in cases of disruption in order to fulfill its purpose of providing
accurate, see, e.g., Weiss, 745 F.2d 786, the JCAH, A.O.A., and Medicare Conditions of Par-
ticipation have all retained the requirement of two sets of bylaws.
43. See cases cited supra notes 6 & 7.
44. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Gonzales v. Nork and
Mercy Hosps. of Sacramento, No. 228566 (Sacramento Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1973).
45. "Without regard to the absence of any legal liability, the hospital in admitting a
physician or surgeon to its facilities extends a moral imprimatur to him in the eyes of the
public." Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 64 (D.D.C. 1963) (quoted in
Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 277, 540 P.2d 1398, 1402 (1975)). See also Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1575 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46. 101 Wash. 2d 226, 677 P.2d 166 (1984).
47. "Acts of malpractice committed by a staff physician outside the hospital are rele-
vant only if the hospital has actual or constructive notice of them, and where failure to take
some action as a result of such notice is negligence." Id. at 235, 677 P.2d at 172. See also
Fridena v. Evans, 127 Ariz. 516, 622 P.2d 463 (1980).
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quality medical and hospital care in an atmosphere conducive to
it.4 The board may act, therefore, even without language in its by-
laws specifying that staff appointments are conditional on the co-
operation and proper behavior of the appointees. Well-drafted by-
laws, however, serve many important functions. Because of the
emphasis which courts place upon these provisions,"9 good lan-
guage will be very helpful in making a court aware of the flexibility
that is necessary for hospital management to deal appropriately
with the infinitely variable ways practitioners manifest disruptive
behavior.50 In addition, carefully drafted bylaws will serve the
more important purpose of informing all medical staff appointees
that "ability to work with others" is a criterion they are required
to meet to be eligible for initial medical staff appointment and for
continued appointment. The hospital should place appropriate lan-
guage in both the corporate bylaws and those of the medical staff.
A. Corporate Bylaws
When dealing with disruptive physicians, the "reality" of the
hospital experience leads to the conclusion that disciplinary action
for disruptive behavior more properly rests with the board and
management than with the medical staff. Frequently, incidents
and manifestations of the problem are experienced most directly
and continually by hospital personnel, not other physicians.
By reason of their specialties or their schedules, many physicians
on the medical staff do not regularly encounter their colleagues in
day-to-day practice in the hospital. Furthermore, if the intolerable
conduct is directed primarily at nurses or other hospital personnel,
48. "An organized governing body, or designated persons so functioning is responsible
for establishing policy, maintaining quality patient care, and providing for institutional
management and planning." JCAH, supra note 3, at 4.1; see also A.O.A., supra note 3, at 8;
Medicare Conditions of Participation, 42 C.F.R. § 405.1021 (1983).
49. See infra notes 61-69, 89-94 and accompanying text.
50. Perhaps in no other field are bylaws so important, yet so cavalierly treated. Hospi-
tal management, medical staff leadership, even hospital counsel, are often insensitive to the
point of obliviousness to the necessity of careful drafting of hospital and medical staff by-
laws and other documents. Courts look to the bylaws to determine hospital policy and pro-
cedures. All too often those documents are mere "cut and paste jobs" performed without
thought or analysis.
The medical staff is an integral part of the hospital. See, e.g., Weiss, 745 F.2d 786, and
Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 156. Inartfully drafted medical staff bylaws may give the impression
that the medical staff is a separate entity from the hospital. Such an impression is legally
incorrect and may create a risk of legal liability. See Bhatt v. Uniontown Hosp., C.A. No.
83-2455 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1984); Horty, The Legal Status of the Medical Staff, ACTION-KIT
FOR HOSPITAL LAW (Jan. 1984).
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other medical staff appointees may be personally unaware of it.
Because the rest of the medical staff does not see and feel the ef-
fects itself, it is often blind or indifferent to its seriousness. As a
result, it does not act, or procrastinates or minimizes the problem,
which heightens the effect with respect to hospital personnel.
Even where the behavior affects other physicians, the medical
staff structure may not be the ideal vehicle for dealing with it. For
one thing, those who are not personally affected may see it as
nothing but a "personality conflict" and may not wish to deal with
it for fear of setting a precedent of conduct for other of their peers
or themselves." On the other hand, it may in fact be a matter be-
tween two physicians, in which case there is danger that supporters
will rally behind each and turn a disciplinary matter into a power
struggle. Furthermore, in addition to their vulnerability to
counter-attacks or a change in referral patterns, there is a reluc-
tance to act on the part of physicians which stems from their view
of their relationship to the hospital as purely individual without a
sense of identification with hospital operation. If the issue is not
one of clinical competence, it is not, in their view, any of their bus-
iness. For any and all of these reasons, if discipline is left only to
the medical staff, it may never occur, or may be undertaken in a
highly charged atmosphere which is unduly traumatic and virtually
invites litigation.
The hospital should exercise jurisdiction over these matters and
can do so by providing the initiative and the appropriate proce-
dures in its own bylaws. This focuses attention on the problem
where it is being felt, in the management and employees. The
board will relieve the medical staff of a responsibility for which it
has neither the taste nor the experience, and will give recognition
to the fact that the problem is one between the hospital and the
individual physician, not between the physician and his colleagues.
The board's involvement in disciplinary matters also makes it
apparent to hospital employees that the board is aware of its obli-
gation to run an efficient and effective hospital. This does not pre-
clude the medical staff from making a recommendation to the
board, but clearly provides the hospital the option to assume con-
trol in a situation in which the medical staff is reluctant to take
action. When a physician understands that he is accountable di-
rectly to the board for his personal conduct or behavior, the hospi-
tal may have less difficulty in changing behavior in an informal
51. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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way than when the physician perceives that he would be bending
to the wishes of his colleagues in matters that he considers none of
their business.
Therefore, to give the hospital appropriate tools, the following
language should be included in the hospital's corporate bylaws:
The Board shall appoint a medical staff operating in accordance with these
bylaws and those bylaws of the medical staff approved by the Board. The
medical staff shall operate as an integral part of the hospital corporation
and, through its department chairmen, committees and officers, shall be re-
sponsible and accountable to the Board for the discharge of those duties
and responsibilities delegated to it by the Board from time to time. The
Board specifically reserves the authority to take any direct action it deems
appropriate with respect to any individual appointed to the medical staff or
given clinical privileges or the right to practice in the hospital. Action taken
by the Board in such matters may, but need not, follow the procedures out-
lined in the medical staff bylaws. Any Board action that would result in a
reduction of clinical privileges, suspension of clinical privileges for a month
or more, revocation of staff appointment or denial of reappointment shall
entitle the affected individual to a hearing and appeal as outlined in the
medical staff bylaws except that (a) the members of the Hearing Panel shall
be appointed by the Chairman of the Board and (b) at the conclusion of the
hearing, the Committee's recommendation and report shall be sent directly
to the Board.
B. Medical Staff Bylaws
Although it should not be burdened with the primary responsi-
bility for dealing with disruptive behavior, the medical staff should
also be delegated authority for undertaking disciplinary action in
these matters. This delegation is in addition to the hospital's abil-
ity to act in the absence of a medical staff committee
recommendation.
Most significantly, the hospital must be sure that the medical
staff bylaws do not contain any language which narrowly limits the
grounds for suspension or termination, or a refusal to appoint.
Narrowly written bylaw provisions may prejudice the hospital's
ability to terminate a physician for conduct which would, in the
absence of such self-limiting language, be a proper and legally sup-
portable basis for taking action.5 2 The following language should
52. See, e.g., Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center, infra notes 61-69 and accompany-
ing text (in addition to proof of disruptive behavior, bylaw provision was interpreted to also
require proof of a direct negative effect on patient care); McElhinney v. William Booth
Memorial Hosp., infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (bylaw provision requiring
"gross" conduct narrowly interpreted).
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be placed in the medical staff bylaws under "Qualifications for Ap-
pointment" to ensure that medical staff leadership has the proper
tools to take action:
Appointment to the medical staff is a privilege which shall be extended only
to professionally competent individuals who continuously meet the qualifi-
cations, standards and requirements set forth in these bylaws and in such
policies as are adopted from time to time by the Board. Only physicians and
oral surgeons (and podiatrists) who can document their background, experi-
ence, training and demonstrated competence, their adherence to the ethics
of their profession, their good reputation and character and their ability to
work harmoniously with others sufficiently to convince the hospital that all
patients treated by them in the hospital will receive quality care and that
the hospital and its medical staff will be able to operate in an orderly man-
ner shall be qualified for appointment to the medical staff. The word "char-
acter" is intended to include the applicant's mental and emotional stability.
V. WHEN CAN THE HOSPITAL ACT?
A. Denial of Initial Appointment to the Medical Staff
A hospital is not obligated to appoint to its medical staff a prac-
titioner who has evidenced patterns of disruptive behavior at other
hospitals or during the course of his medical training, either in
medical school or as an intern or resident. In this regard, a record
of disruptive conduct is no different from a record of substandard
clinical performance. The hospital has both the right and the duty
to assure itself that new appointees to the medical staff will meet
its standards of both professional performance and personal con-
duct, so long as these standards are reasonably related to the hos-
pital's goals of providing quality medical care and efficient hospital
operation." If the hospital has evidence of, or reasonable doubts
about an applicant's prior conduct, the applicant has the burden of
demonstrating to the hospital's satisfaction that his behavior, as
well as his professional performance, will comport with the hospi-
tal's standards.
Denial of staff appointment based on negative reference letters
or evaluations has been upheld by the courts. Illustrative of such
decisions is the case of Pick v. Santa Ana-Tustin Community Hos-
pital.5 4 Dr. Jan Pick applied for medical staff appointment in the
defendant hospital's psychiatric department. Dr. Pick was denied
53. The idea discussed, supra note 45, that the hospital places its "imprimatur" upon
its staff physicians is an important one. As stated in Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 64, "there is
room for selection."
54. 130 Cal. App. 3d 970, 182 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1982).
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appointment on the basis that his "manifested personality would
create and present a real and substantial danger to the high qual-
ity of medical care both to his patients as well as other physicians'
patients . . .-.
A major reason for the adverse action by the hospital was the
negative tone of the letters of reference from Dr. Pick's former col-
leagues. The hospital had communicated with the various institu-
tions with which Dr. Pick had been associated, requesting informa-
tion about him. The replies disclosed that almost invariably Dr.
Pick had had difficulty in his dealings with his colleagues and the
personnel of the institutions with which he had been associated.
Specifically, the director of the hospital at which Dr. Pick had
completed his internship stated in a letter that "[h]e did have
some difficulty in his interpersonal relationships particularly in his
response to criticism, ability to work with others, and leader-
ship." s The chief of professional education of a hospital at which
Dr. Pick had been a resident for two years, stated that Dr. Pick
"performed satisfactorily as a resident but had some personality
problems which interfered with his relationship with staff and col-
leagues. By mutual agreement he transferred to another program
for his third year of training. '1 7 Finally, in two evaluations from
hospitals at which Dr. Pick had had privileges, he was rated "be-
low average" with respect to the factors of emotional stability and
control and professional relations with patients.
Based on this evidence, as well as that of specific incidents in
which Dr. Pick had caused problems, the California Court of Ap-
peals found that he had not met his "burden of establishing his
ability to work with others in a hospital setting in a manner that
would assure that high quality medical care would be furnished pa-
tients at the hospital."58 Thus, the hospital's denial of appoint-
ment was upheld. 9
55. Id. at 975, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
56. Id. at 980, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
57. Id. at 981, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
58. Id. at 983, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
59. For other cases in which courts have upheld a hospital's denial of initial appoint-
ment because of disruptive behavior of the applicant, see Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen.
Hosp., 564 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1977); Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial
Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971); Dunbar v. Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County, 227 Ga.
534, 182 S.E.2d 89 (1971); Silver v. Queen's Hosp., 63 Hawaii 430, 629 P.2d 1116 (1981);
Ladenheim v. Union County Hosp. Dist., 76 Ill. App. 3d 90, 394 N.E.2d 770 (1979); Sussman
v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n., 95 N.J. Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389 (1967); Theissen v. Watonga
Municipal Hosp. Bd., 550 P.2d 938 (Okla. 1976); Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d
1398 (1975); Hagen v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp. of Rhode Island, 102 R.I. 717, 232 A.2d 596
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The hospital must not only have reasonable criteria for appoint-
ment,60 but it must also apply those criteria appropriately. In
Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center,"1 the California Supreme
Court upheld a hospital medical staff bylaws provision which re-
quired applicants to document "their ability to work with others,
with sufficient adequacy to assure the Medical Staff and the Board
of Trustees that any patient treated by them in the hospital will be
given a high quality of medical care . ,," The court disap-
proved, however, of the specific application of this bylaw in Dr.
Miller's case. Dr. Miller, a board certified family practitioner, ap-
plied for appointment to Eisenhower Medical Center. With his ap-
plication, he submitted the names of twenty-five physicians who
could be contacted for recommendations. Letters were sent to all
twenty-five, many of whom responded.
On the basis of the comments received, the executive committee
of the medical staff made a recommendation to the hospital board
that Dr. Miller be denied appointment. Dr. Miller duly requested a
hearing. At the hearing, a representative for the medical staff exec-
utive committee reported that there was no question about Dr.
Miller's professional capabilities or his competence as a physician,
"but that the committee felt that [he] 'came up wanting' with re-
spect to the opinions received on the question whether he would be
an asset to the medical staff."63 Four physicians testified on Dr.
Miller's behalf. Although each was of the opinion that he would be
an asset to the medical staff, when asked about his "interpersonal"
relationships, their answers indicated that there might be a
problem.
Ultimately, the hospital hearing panel upheld the medical staff
executive committee's recommendation to deny appointment,
based upon the determination that sufficient doubt existed con-
(1967); Rao v. Auburn Gen. Hosp., 19 Wash. App. 124, 573 P.2d 834 (1978).
60. See Medicare Conditions of Participation, 42 C.F.Y § 405.1021(e)(3) (1983);
JCAH, supra note 3, at 10.1.2; A.O.A., supra note 3, at 15.
61. 27 Cal. 3d 614, 614 P.2d 258, 166 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1980).
62. Id. at 621 n.5, 614 P.2d at 261 n.5, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 829 n.5 (emphasis in original).
63. Id. at 621, 614 P.2d at 261, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 829. The court noted that out of 22
responses to the question of whether Dr. Miller would be an asset to the medical staff:
[Alpproximately 15 were favorable, some enthusiastically so. Of the seven remaining
responses, four were clearly unfavorable. Two of these answered simply: "No." One
answered: "Very controversial person. Has been disruptive in other situations." One
answered: "I have no knowledge of Dr. Miller's plans regarding [Eisenhower Medical





cerning Dr. Miller's ability to work with others as required by the
medical staff bylaws.
Dr. Miller appealed to the hospital board. At this appellate re-
view, two additional physicians testified that:
[Dr. Miller] . . . had a reputation for getting along poorly with his col-
leagues. One stated that he "creates dissension" and "has relatively few
friends in the community," the other that he "does not get along with most
members of the medical community." Neither, however, indicated that he
had personally had any difficulty working together with plaintiff in the care
of patients."
The board affirmed the recommendation of the medical staff exec-
utive committee and denied Dr. Miller's application for appoint-
ment. Dr. Miller then sought to compel the hospital to appoint
him to the staff via the court system. The trial court denied his
petition. Dr. Miller appealed.
One of Dr. Miller's arguments was that the bylaws provision was
"so vague and uncertain as to provide a substantial danger of arbi-
trary or discriminatory application, and that it must therefore be
held invalid. ' '65 The California Supreme Court disagreed. It upheld
the bylaw provision, noting:
It cannot be denied that the providing of high quality patient care is, quite
properly, the primary concern of all hospital institutions. The governing au-
thority bears the responsibility for assuring that this goal is achieved to the
greatest extent possible, and its decisions relating to medical staff must take
into account all factors which have a legitimate relationship to it. We are
not prepared to say that an applicant's ability to work with other medical
personnel in the hospital setting may not have a clear effect on the level of
patient care provided."
After making the bylaw determination, however, the California
high court narrowly interpreted the bylaw provision by requiring a
direct nexus between the disruptive behavior and patient safety:
[The bylaw here at issue] must be read to demand a showing, in cases of
rejection on this ground, that an applicant's inability to "work with others"
in the hospital setting is such as to present a real and substantial danger
that patients treated by him might receive other than a "high quality of
medical care" at the facility if he were admitted to membership.
67
The court gave the hospital the option of appointing Dr. Miller to
its staff or conducting "further administrative proceedings directed
64. Id. at 622, 614 P.2d at 262, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
65. Id. at 626, 614 P.2d at 265, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 833.




to the assessment of plaintiff's qualifications for admission to its
medical staff in light of a proper interpretation of its stan-
dards. "8 The Miller decision highlights the paramount importance
of careful bylaws drafting.69 Courts, like Miller, may narrowly con-
strue such language and consequently overly restrict the ability of
the medical staff leadership and governing body to properly handle
practitioners whose inappropriate behavior may disrupt the or-
derly management of the hospital. Most courts, however, have ap-
plied a less strict interpretation of bylaws language.
In Hagan v. Osteopathic General Hospital of Rhode Island'70 a
physician who was denied appointment to the staff of the hospital
at which he completed his internship sought a court order compel-
ling the hospital to appoint him. Although the trial court con-
ducted a thorough evidentiary hearing, it ultimately decided that,
because the hospital was a private corporation, its decision was not
subject to judicial review and dismissed the complaint. The physi-
cian appealed.
On review, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island elected to con-
sider the doctor's chances of success on the merits. If he had none,
it would not be necessary for the court to rule on the question of
whether the court had the power of judicial review. The physician's
principal contention was that the hospital decision was arbitrary,
capricious and unreasonable. The trial court found that the de-
fendant trustees had rejected the plaintiff's several applications for
appointment because of a personality clash with the hospital ad-
ministrator, because it appointed another physician, and because
the trustees felt that the plaintiff might be a potential disruptive
force in the hospital. In reviewing and upholding that determina-
tion, the supreme court held:
The record is replete with evidence of incidents involving personality
clashes from which the trial justice could draw the inference that the Trust-
ees were motivated in their decision on each application by a desire to avoid
the creation of a hospital ambience not conducive to the best interests of
the sick and injured for whose welfare the hospital existed.
68. Id. at 636, 614 P.2d at 271, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (emphasis added). However,
Eisenhower Medical Center never had to make the choice. As reported in a California news-
paper, Dr. Miller was sentenced to 25 years in prison for conspiring to murder his wife.
Miller Ruled Guilty of Plotting Murder, PAM SPRINGS DESERT SUN, April 23, 1980, § 1, at
1, col. 1.
69. Compare quoted text accompanying supra note 62 with suggested bylaw provision
in text following supra note 52.
70. 102 R.I. 717, 232 A.2d 596 (1967).
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When the motivating circumstances of a decision made to achieve a valid
purpose bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose intended to be
achieved by the decision, such decision will not be disturbed by the courts
as being arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable within the meaning of the
equal protection guarantee."
Similarly, in Laje v. R.E. Thomason General Hospital,72 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a denial of initial appoint-
ment. In that case, the hospital refused to appoint a psychiatrist
on the grounds of incompetence and insubordination. The physi-
cian had been employed by the hospital as clinical director of psy-
chiatry but was summarily discharged for "insubordination" with
eleven months remaining on his contract of employment. He then
applied for appointment to the staff, but the hospital postponed
definitive action on his request and refused to give him a hearing.
Dr. Laje obtained an order from the federal district court directing
the hospital board to provide him a hearing.
At the hearing, allegations of both incompetence and insubordi-
nation were considered. On the insubordination issue, there was
testimony to the effect that the doctor had refused to cooperate in
treating drug addicts, had employed restraints in violation of hos-
pital policy, and had been unable to get along with the medical
director. After the hospital board decided to deny his application,
the physician returned to court. The district court held that the
board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and or-
dered the hospital to appoint him, but the order was stayed pend-
ing the hospital's appeal.
When the circuit court reviewed the record, it reversed the dis-
trict court, saying:
As for the substantiality of the evidence upon which the board's adverse
decision was based, we find that the record contains sufficient evidence to
support the denial of privileges. The evidence presented at the hearing re-
lated to the level of Dr. Laje's professional competence and his ability to
function smoothly in the hospital setting. Thus, the board complied with
this Court's guideline ... that "in exercising its broad discretion the board
must refuse staff applicants only for those matters which are reasonably re-
lated to the operation of the hospital.
7 3
Once again, an appellate court recognized smooth working relation-
ships as a proper, and enforceable, requirement of medical staff
appointees.
71. Id. at 726, 232 A.2d at 601-02.
72. 564 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1977).
73. Id. at 1162.
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The Washington Court of Appeals also reached a similar conclu-
sion in Rao v. Auburn General Hospital.74 Although the factual
basis upon which Dr. Rao's requests for appointment was denied is
not set forth in the court's opinion in detail, a footnote75 indicates
that her "personality" played some part in the decision. The court
held that:
In its own interest and in the public interest, a hospital does have the dis-
cretionary right to exclude doctors from staff privileges, whether based on
the doctor's lack of proficiency or upon the concern that the doctor has a
personality which will be detrimental to the working of the hospital.
76
These judicial decisions recognize that if there is evidence that a
practitioner's behavior might impede the orderly operation of the
hospital or affect the proper discharge of his responsibilities to the
hospital or to his patients, the hospital may deny his initial appli-
cation for appointment to the medical staff regardless of his tech-
nical medical competence. The criterion which addresses the har-
mony of the organization is a valid one. Thus, the practitioner-
applicant who has a track record of disruptiveness can be denied.
B. Denial of Reappointment to the Medical Staff
Every court which has reviewed a hospital's denial of reappoint-
ment due to the physician's disruptive behavior has found such
misconduct to be a sufficient basis for the decision not to reap-
point. In Ladenheim v. Union County Hospital District,"7 the
medical staff of a public hospital recommended approval of Dr.
Ladenheim's reappointment, even though he had exhibited unco-
operative behavior in the past. The board of directors refused to
accept the recommendation and decided not to reappoint him. Dr.
Ladenheim sued and obtained a restraining order, giving him ac-
cess to the hospital's facilities until the hospital held a hearing to
determine his eligibility for reappointment.
Prior to the hearing, plaintiff received a five-page notice of hear-
ing which set forth sixteen general charges of unprofessional con-
duct and listed twenty-one separate incidents which formed the
basis for the charges. At the hearing, the charges were substanti-
ated by evidence which the court summarized in these words:
After hearing the evidence, the Credentials Committee [who acted as the
74. 19 Wash. App. 124, 573 P.2d 834 (1978).
75. Id. at 128 n.1, 573 P.2d at 837 n.1.
76. Id. at 127, 573 P.2d at 836.
77. 76 Ill. App. 3d 90, 394 N.E.2d 770 (1979).
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hearing panel] concluded that the following allegations were true:
In August, 1976, during a dispute over administrative procedures, [Dr.
Ladenheim] told a physical therapist that she had body odor and repeated
the conversation to two other hospital employees.
In March, 1976, after receiving a bill for laboratory work done on a patient
not sufficiently identified to allow direct billing of the patient, [Dr.
Ladenheim] returned the bill with a note indicating that the business office
staff was stupid.
In January, 1976, [he] refused to admit a patient to Union County Hospital,
telling a relative of the patient that he was "mad at the hospital."
[He] refused to complete a medical planning form titled "Discharge Plan-
ning" on a nursing home patient, writing "you dreamer" across the space
provided for his in-put.
On several occasions [he] made disparaging remarks to or refused to work
with a particular nurse, and in one instance told her that an emergency
room patient could go to another hospital "or go to hell" as far as he was
concerned, because the patient was receiving medical assistance from
welfare.
[He] refused to bring his criticisms of the nursing staff to the director of
nursing, circumventing her entirely in favor of complaining to the hospital
administrator. In addition, he indicated to another staff member that it was
useless to request the nursing director's assistance, because she would not
take any action.
In June of 1975 and in February of 1976, [he] refused nurses' requests to
come to the emergency room to attend patients. He left standing orders
that no nurse was to institute cardio-pulmonary resuscitation on any of his
patients until receiving orders from him or another doctor.7 8
When faced with that array of incidents and evidence, the creden-
tials committee voted to recommend against reappointing Dr.
Ladenheim. Appeals to the hospital's joint conference committee,
the full medical staff, the board of directors, and the Union County
Circuit Court of Appeals followed and failed.
The latter court's conclusion strongly endorsed the hospital's de-
cision as having a valid basis in the evidence:
[T]he record is replete with evidence of appellant's inability to work effec-
tively with other members of the hospital staff, and it is apparent that this
personality problem was the principle (sic) issue before the Credentials
Committee. . . .Clearly, appellant's inability to work with other members
of the hospital staff was in itself sufficient grounds to deny him staff
privileges.
... [W]e believe that a rational connection exists between the hearing
and review provisions of the Bylaws, which were followed and afforded to
appellant, and the Hospital District's insurance of professional and ethical
qualifications of the staff physicians for the good of both the hospital and





In Robbins v. Ong,80 the hospital denied Dr. Robbins' reappoint-
ment because of his disruptive behavior. Dr. Robbins' conduct in-
cluded throwing a scrub brush outside the operating room, abusive
shouting, interruption of a nurses' training session, verbal attacks
on hospital employees, and disregard for hospital policy. Dr. Rob-
bins asked the court to grant an injunction to restrain the hospital
from revoking or refusing to renew his privileges. In its opinion
denying Dr. Robbins' request, the federal district court described
the personality of the disruptive physician and the position of the
courts in these cases as follows:
At the hearing before this Court, patients of the plaintiff and physicians
attested to his ability as a doctor. His competence is not in issue. What is in
issue is the turmoil and disruption he has brought to the Liberty County
Hospital for years. Apparently he is imbued with the idea that where Dr.
Robbins sits, there is the head of the table. Rules are for others, not him.
The trouble with this conception is that the Hospital is a public institution,
not his private domain. It is operated by the Authority, a thought which he
apparently cannot tolerate.
Personalities are at the heart of the problem. . . . It is for the Authority
to decide whether personality differences are detrimental to the efficient op-
eration of the hospital. This Court should not substitute its evaluation for
that of the authority.8'
In Yarnell v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services, Inc., 2 the
Indiana Court of Appeals reaffirmed that disruptive behavior is a
sufficient reason to exclude a physician from a hospital, and that
the governing board of the hospital is ultimately responsible for
the medical staff appointment process.
Specifically, in January 1981, the medical board (the equivalent
of the medical staff executive committee in other hospitals) recom-
mended that Dr. Yarnell, an anesthesiologist, not be reappointed
to the staff. A hearing was held according to the bylaws. The hear-
ing committee recommended that Dr. Yarnell be reappointed. The
medical board then changed its recommendation and also recom-
mended to the governing board that Dr. Yarnell be reappointed.
The administrator and executive director opposed Dr. Yarnell's re-
appointment because he was threatening and abusive to medical
staff personnel and was generally disruptive of hospital procedures.
79. Id. at 98, 394 N.E.2d at 776.
80. 452 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
81. Id. at 115.
82. - Ind. App. -, 446 N.E.2d 359 (1983).
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After receiving this information, the governing board notified Dr.
Yarnell that another hearing would be held.
Before the second hearing could be held, Dr. Yarnell sued asking
the court to enjoin the hospital from relieving him of his staff ap-
pointment and subjecting him to the hearing. The trial court dis-
missed the suit. Dr. Yarnell appealed. Dr. Yarnell argued on ap-
peal that the governing board was bound by the medical board's
favorable recommendation because of a bylaws provision which
stated that once a recommendation was received from the medical
board, "the Governing Board shall appoint" the individual with
specific privileges.83 The court disagreed, stating:
Even though the Governing Board has delegated some of its authority, it
still remains ultimately responsible for the efficient operation of the Hospi-
tal and maintenance of high standards of professional care imposed by the
Hospital bylaws and statute.
8 4
The court also disagreed with Dr. Yarnell's contention that the
administrator and executive director had acted with prejudice or
malice toward him. The court found that they were merely carry-
ing out their duties on behalf of the hospital. On the other hand,
the court noted that the evidence indicated that Dr. Yarnell was a
disruptive physician and was unable to work with others. This pro-
vided the hospital sufficient reason to deny him staff privileges.
The Yarnell decision is especially important because it reaffirms
the authority of the governing board, and it specifically endorses
the involvement of hospital management in the reappointment
process.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court also upheld a denial of re-
appointment based upon trial court findings that Dr. Bricker had
been "a disruptive force" in the hospital. In Bricker v. Sceva
Speare Memorial Hospital,"s the supreme court held that the hos-
83. Id. at , 446 N.E.2d at 361.
84. Id. at -, 446 N.E.2d at 362-63.
85. 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971). It is noted that
many of these practitioners are quite litigious. Among the most litigious was Dr. Glenn
Bricker, whose final review before the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Bricker v. Crane,
caused the court to note "[tihis case is the most recent skirmish in a long legal combat
which threatens to become a modern Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, C. Dickens, Bleak House pas-
sim (1853)." 118 N.H. 249, 249, 387 A.2d 321, 321 (1978). This list includes: Bricker v. Sceva
Speare Memorial Hosp., 115 N.H. 709, 350 A.2d 623 (1975); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memo-
rial Hosp., 114 N.H. 229, 317 A.2d 563 (1974), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973); Bricker v.
Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 339 F. Supp. 234 (D.N.H. 1972), afJ'd, Bricker v. Crane, 468
F.2d 1228 (lst Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memo-
rial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Bricker v. Sceva
Speare Memorial Hosp., 110 N.H. 412, 270 A.2d 358 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995
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pital board's decision was justified. The decision was necessary in
order to preserve and protect the hospital, in light of its duty to
maintain the hospital for service to all the public.
It is clear that the disruptive practitioner-albeit otherwise com-
petent-has no more reason than the medically incompetent prac-
titioner to assume that he will be automatically reappointed to the
hospital medical staff. The hospital board may, and indeed should,
consider and act upon a pattern or patterns of unacceptable behav-
ior when it makes its determination as to reappointment. The
medical staff leadership should not be diffident about applying be-
havioral criteria in its evaluation process preparatory to making
recommendations to the governing body.
C. Dealing with Disruptive Behavior During the Practitioner's
Term of Appointment
1. Necessity for Immediate Action
A somewhat more difficult question arises when the issue is the
course to follow when the disruptive behavior occurs during the
term of appointment and is of such a nature or degree of severity
that it is not appropriate to wait until the end of the term to take
action.
Personal conduct, no less than clinical performance, may pose
such a threat to the safety and well-being of patients and the effi-
cient operation of the hospital itself as to warrant the imposition
of immediate action. There is no sound reason to distinguish be-
tween poor clinical performance and poor conduct or behavior in
taking action during the term of a practitioner's appointment. In-
deed, there is no question that, given supporting evidence, medical
staff appointments and clinical privileges may be terminated dur-
ing the term of appointment. 6 In Grodjesk v. Jersey City Medical
Center,7 disruptive behavior was held to be a valid basis for the
termination of two oral surgeons in a hospital emergency room ro-
(1971). Other litigious physicians have included Dr. Charumati Rao: Rao v. Auburn Gen.
Hosp., 19 Wash. App. 124, 573 P.2d 834 (1978); Rao v. Auburn Gen. Hosp., 10 Wash. App.
361, 517 P.2d 240 (1973); and Rao v. Board of County Comm'rs., 80 Wash. 2d 695, 497 P.2d
591 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1017 (1972); and Dr. Maurice Silver: Silver v. Queen's
Hosp., 63 Hawaii 430, 629 P.2d 1116 (1981); Silver v. Queen's Hosp., 518 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976); Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 675, 501
P.2d 60 (1972); Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564 (1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 1131 (1973).
86. See, e.g., Peterson v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., Inc., 114 Ariz. App. 66, 559 P.2d 186
(1976); Anderson v. Board of Trustees of Caro Community Hosp., 10 Mich. App. 348, 159
N.W.2d 347 (1968).
87. 135 N.J. Super. 393, 343 A.2d 489 (1975).
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tation schedule. Termination of employment of a thoracic surgeon
by the Veterans Administration has been likewise upheld."8
The case of McElhinney v. William Booth Memorial Hospital,s
presents an apparent contrary view. The Kentucky Supreme Court
held that the hospital's evidence did not meet the standard set in
its own bylaws. In this case, the appointment and clinical privi-
leges of Dr. McElhinney, a surgeon, were terminated on the basis
of "gross unethical or moral misconduct," the language used in the
medical staff bylaws. The evidence against him was catalogued by
the court as follows:
We glean from the evidence that appellant probably incurred the wrath of
the hospital administration when he insisted that an investigation be made
of the complaint of one of his surgical patients that a supervisory nurse had
made lesbian overtures to her. It seems that [h]e also complained about the
dust levels in the operating room. He entered a collision course with a phy-
sician named Richfield, who was the chief of pathology at the hospital com-
plain[ing] that Richfield was too frequently unavailable to read frozen sec-
tion slides and left too much responsibility to assistants who were not
pathologists. [He] was dissatisfied with the performance of the X-ray de-
partment. He entered criticisms of professional performance and hospital
procedure upon the records. [He] was doubtless somewhat abrasive to
others in his insistence upon what he conceived to be required standards of
care.90
In finding for the physician and directing that Dr. McElhinney be
reinstated, the court determined that his conduct did not violate
the standards for termination expressed in the bylaws.9 1
It is plain from the court's language that it perceived the hospi-
tal's action as an attempt, for essentially petty reasons, to jettison
"an especially competent, dedicated and busy surgeon whose prime
concern is the welfare of his patients and the improvement of hos-
pital conditions.""2 Because the pertinent bylaw provisions were
quite broad and, more importantly, required that the offending
88. Gilbert v. Johnson, 419 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
89. 544 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1976).
90. Id. at 217.
91. Id. at 218. The provision in question provided for suspension and termination sub-
stantially as follows: "Suspension: (1) gross professional incompetence or dereliction, (2)
gross unethical or moral misconduct, (3) violations of hospital regulations and policies to
such an extent that disciplinary action is deemed advisable. Termination: 'Violation of suffi-
cient gravity to warrant such action.'" The court said: "The express standards, vague
though they be, do not condemn criticisms relating to treatment of patients or hospital
practice nor do they proscribe inability to get along with some doctors or hospital person-
nel." Id.
92. Id. at 217. See also Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d
431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1962).
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conduct be gross, it is not surprising that the court found them to
be a standard not met by the evidence and not sufficiently definite
in proscribing the conduct on which the physician's termination
was grounded. 3
It is essential to note that the court expressed "no opinion as to
the validity of a reasonably definite standard undertaking to pro-
scribe and make a cause of termination inability to work in har-
mony with other hospital personnel."94 The court also observed
that none of the charges against the doctor "affect patient care."
Thus, the case cannot be read as a rejection of the hospital's right
to terminate a staff appointment for disruptive behavior.
A particular concern respecting the question of termination dur-
ing appointment is that a single episode of disruptive behavior
which, taken alone, might not appear to be sufficiently serious to
warrant revocation of privileges, may actually be the one in a series
of similar episodes which render the practitioner's continued pres-
ence in the hospital no longer tolerable. The hospital need not wait
until reappointment time to act, nor should it be reluctant to initi-
ate proceedings because it did not deny reappointment on the ba-
sis of the previous episodes.
This is an issue which is often raised by practitioners when they
are finally called to task. They urge that because the hospital did
not act in a particular instance in the past, it is precluded by some
form of institutional laches from considering past behavior when
it eventually acts to discipline the disruptive practitioner. No court
has yet held that by failing to take action at some particular point
in a continuing course of disruptive conduct, the hospital has, in
effect, waived earlier incidents and is therefore foreclosed from
considering them in revoking an appointment.
In fact, the exact opposite view was maintained by the Colorado
Court of Appeals in Leonard v. Board of Directors, Prowers
County Hospital District,9" when it rejected a physician's claim
that the use of a 1977 complaint against him in a hearing held in
1980 "prove[d] the board's bias against him because since 1977 the
board had annually renewed [his] staff privileges. ' 96 The court
93. 544 S.W.2d at 218. Dr. McElhinney subsequently filed an antitrust suit against
numerous defendants which was utlimately decided in favor of the defendants. See supra
note 23.
94. 544 S.W.2d at 218.
95. 673 P.2d 1019 (Colo. App. 1983).
96. Id. at 1023.
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found that the doctor's " 'stale charge' argument" 7 was without
merit.
Likewise, in Miller v. Indiana Hospital,9 on a similar question,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated:
Merely reappointing appellant annually to the staff did not indicate an in-
tention on the part of the hospital to ignore the cumulative effect of appel-
lant's prior misconduct. Appellant has neither alleged nor proven any reli-
ance upon the assumption that the actions of the hospital constituted a
waiver. It was therefore proper for the hospital committees to consider prior
misconduct which may not have been so egregious in any one year as to
warrant denial of reappointment, but the cumulative effect of which called
for appellant's dismissal from the staff."
2. Summary Suspension During the Term of Appointment
An important related issue is whether the hospital medical staff
leadership or management may invoke the remedy of summary
suspension 00 in the case of either a single episode of disruptive-
ness or in light of a pattern of prior misconduct. There is authority
for summary action when only one instance of clinical misbehavior
comes to light.10 1 Perhaps the same rationale could apply to dis-
ruptive, as distinguished from clinical, misbehavior. The miscon-
duct or disruptive behavior, however, would have to be of such se-
verity and immediacy that it can be shown to threaten patient
safety or directly impair the orderly operation and management of
the institution. The courts are divided on this question. Some sug-
gest that summary suspension is usually not the first choice of
remedy for handling the disruptive practitioner. 1 2
A good example of a situation in which summary suspension was
97. Id.
98. 277 Pa. Super. 37, 419 A.2d 1191 (1980).
99. Id. at 377, 419 A.2d at 1194. See also Rutledge v. St. Vincent Memorial Hosp., 67
Ill. App. 2d 156, 214 N.E.2d 131 (1966).
100. The vast majority of hospital medical staff bylaws contain provisions which per-
mit designated medical staff leadership, the chief executive officer and the chairman of the
hospital board to suspend practitioners summarily in situations involving threats to patient
safety or the orderly operations of the hospital.
101. See, e.g., Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1196, 1214 n.5 (W.D. Wis.
1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974); Storrs v. Lutheran Hosps. and Homes Soc'y. of
Am., Inc., 661 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1983); cf. Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
102. See, e.g., McMillan v. Anchorage Community Hosp., 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982);
Park Hosp. Dist. v. District Court, 192 Col. 69, 555 P.2d 984 (1976) (en banc); Ritter v.
Board of Comm'rs of Adams County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 96 Wash. 2d 503, 637 P.2d 940
(1981) (en banc); cf. Eidelson v. Archer, 645 P.2d 171, 180 (Alaska 1982).
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disapproved is McMillan v. Anchorage Community Hospital.13 In
1975, while Dr. McMillan, an anesthesiologist who had been ap-
pointed to the medical staff of the defendant hospital two years
earlier, was out of state taking board certification examinations,
the chief executive officer sent a letter to his home summarily sus-
pending his privileges because of his disruptive behavior. Accord-
ing to the court, "[t]he charge of disruptiveness was based on a
series of problems and incidents occurring from 1973 through 1975
between McMillan and the nursing staff, other staff physicians, a
nurse anesthetist, and the relatives of several patients."'14 Dr. Mc-
Millan requested and was granted a hearing. The hearing commit-
tee upheld the suspension and the board affirmed the hearing com-
mittee's decision. Dr. McMillan sued.
The case eventually reached the Alaska Supreme Court. The is-
sue was whether the circumstances leading to the charge of disrup-
tiveness against McMillan were sufficient for summary suspension
of his privileges. Dr. McMillan argued that under the terms of the
medical staff bylaws and the requirements of due process, sum-
mary suspension is only proper where there is some emergency or
immediate need for suspension in the best interests of patient care.
Although the court found that "there need not always be evidence
of a clear connection between disruptive conduct and any immedi-
ate threat to patient care in order to justify suspension of staff
privileges on the basis of disruptive conduct,"' 05 it concluded that
in this case the summary suspension was not justified.'06
Despite this conclusion, however, the court declined to order the
hospital to reinstate him as he had requested. Instead, the court
ordered the hospital to compensate Dr. McMillan for his loss of
income from the date of the summary suspension until the time
that he was properly suspended following the hearing under the
medical staff bylaws.
Clinical misbehavior together with patterns of disruption will
support summary action. In Kiracofe v. Reid Memorial Hospi-
tal,07 a physician was summarily suspended because of his clinical
103. 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982).
104. Id. at 859.
105. Id. at 867 n.13.
106. Id. at 866. This conclusion was based in large part on the testimony of the hospi-
tal's chief executive officer, which demonstrated that the doctor was viewed as a continuing
problem and it was a consensus to get rid of him so that things could be more pleasant. Id.
at 860 n.3.
107. - Ind. App. -, 461 N.E.2d 1134 (1984). See also Cipriotti v. Board of Directors




judgment in treating a patient. His appointment was later termi-
nated, based not only upon that incident, but also upon a history
replete with disciplinary actions for disruptive behavior.
The particular incident in Kiracofe is instructive because it
highlights the important role of the medical staff leadership in the
disciplinary process. As the court noted, the chief of the medical
staff summarily suspended Dr. Kiracofe for his treatment of a
fourteen year old female patient, who was admitted into the hospi-
tal on January 21, 1982, with a diagnosis of pelvic inflammatory
disease (PID). The admitting diagnosis was not substantiated by
laboratory tests, nor did those tests reveal the presence of either
disease or infection. (The probability of the existence of PID in a
fourteen year old girl is extremely small.) Dr. Kiracofe ordered
treatment with several antibiotics. The chief of family medicine
questioned the advisability of continued hospitalization because
the patient's charts indicated that the treatment was not working.
He requested that Dr. Kiracofe consult another physician, which
he initially refused to do.
On examination, the consulting physician concluded that the pa-
tient's problems were principally emotional, and he recommended
discontinuance of antibiotics. Dr. Kiracofe continued to treat the
patient for PID and prescribed an extremely strong antibiotic.
This order was questioned and the chief of the medical staff met
with Dr. Kiracofe and demanded that he relinquish treatment to
another doctor. Kiracofe requested that the antibiotic be contin-
ued. Kiracofe was summarily suspended by the chief of staff that
day pursuant to the bylaws. The chief of staff also filed formal
charges against Kiracofe.
The medical staff executive committee met to review the suspen-
sion on March 9, 1982, and to hear evidence on Dr. Kiracofe's be-
half. The committee reviewed his personal file which included a
summary of past grievances against him. The committee upheld
the summary suspension and voted to terminate Dr. Kiracofe's
privileges. Kiracofe appealed the committee's recommendation to
the ad hoc committee, which voted to uphold the suspension and
recommended termination. Further appeal was made to an appel-
late review committee, which affirmed the termination. The actions
of these committees were subsequently upheld by the board of
directors.
In upholding the hospital's actions both in summarily sus-
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pending Dr. Kiracofe and in relying on past patterns of inappropri-
ate behavior, the Indiana Court of Appeals found that he had been
treated fairly according to the hospital bylaws. The court reached
this conclusion even though he was not accorded a hearing until
after the summary suspension was imposed."0 8
VI. SYNOPSIS: THE INABILITY TO WORK WITH OTHERS IS
SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT EXCLUSION
It is apparent from the foregoing sections that disruptive behav-
ior alone is sufficient to warrant a practitioner's exclusion from the
hospital. It should also be apparent, however, that such a criterion
by its very nature, cannot be explicitly defined for all cases. It may
be difficult to apply in any particular situation. It raises serious
questions: What is the line to be drawn between strong, but legiti-
mate, questioning of hospital policy and divisiveness approaching
disruption? Does the mere fact that one disagrees make one disa-
greeable? Despite these questions which go to the issue of applica-
tion of the criterion, inability to work with others has been upheld
by the courts as a sufficient reason for denying appointment or re-
appointment and for terminating an appointment before the end
of its term. Analysis of the cases suggests that the critical ques-
tions are whether the hospital applied the criterion reasonably and
whether it afforded the aggrieved practitioner procedural due pro-
cess. In short, the ability to get along with others as a criterion is a
reasonable one, but it must be enforced fairly.
At one time, the question of the hospital's status as a public or
private entity was of importance, but this question has diminished
in significance. The due process requirement does not change be-
cause of the institution's legal status. A court will either apply the
constitutional due process standard using the state action test 09 or
108. - Ind. App. at -, 461 N.E.2d at 1137-39. The majority held that Dr. Kiracofe
was not entitled to due process under the 14th amendment to the Constitution because the
hospital was not a public hospital nor was there proof of state action. Id. An interesting
concurring opinion questioned the majority's position but agreed with the outcome in this
case. Id. at -, 461 N.E. 2d at 1141-44 (Ratliff, J., concurring). See infra note 109 and
accompanying text.
109. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), established a "nexus"
test for cases in which "state action" is alleged. In order to determine whether a hospital's
actions constitute "state action," a court must inquire "whether there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action
of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 351. By so holding that
a privately-owned utility's termination of service is not "state action," the Court in Jackson
made it clear that state involvement without state responsibility cannot establish this nexus.
With the case of Modaber v. Culpeper Memorial Hosp., 674 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1982), the
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it will review the hospital's actions to determine if it followed its
own bylaws, rules and regulations.110 In either aspect, the hospital
is required by law, regulations and accreditation standards to be
fair.1
The hospital has the right, indeed the duty, to ensure that those
who are appointed to its medical staff meet certain standards of
professional competence and personal conduct so long as those
standards are reasonably related to the hospital's mission of pro-
viding quality medical care in an efficiently run hospital. Most
courts express reluctance to substitute their judgment for that of
the governing board.
Huffaker v. Bailey 12 is an example of this judicial reluctance.
Dr. Huffaker applied to a private hospital for appointment and
clinical privileges and was turned down because he failed to suffi-
ciently document, "(1) his ability to work with others in order to
assure that his patients would be given a high quality of medical
care; and (2) his competence in relation to the privileges re-
quested."11 s He sought mandamus to compel the hospital board to
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals fell in line with the other circuits by holding that receipt of
Hill-Burton Funds does not make the recipient's every act "state action." For other circuits
in accord with this decision, see Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59, 62-63 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Hodge v. Paoli Memorial Hosp., 576 F.2d 563, 564 (3d Cir.
1978) (per curiam); Schlein v. Milford Hosp., Inc., 561 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); Madry v. Sorel, 558 F.2d 303, 305-06 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 880-81 (5th Cir. 1975); Briscoe
v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392, 395 (8th Cir. 1976); Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 77 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 948 (1976); Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 520 F.2d
894, 895-06 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Medical
Center, Inc., 507 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1974)). See also Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476
F.2d 671, 675 (10th Cir. 1973) (pre-Jackson).
110. See, e.g., Feldman v. St. Mary's Hosp. and Health Center, 126 Ariz. 262, 614 P.2d
343 (1980); Avol v. Hawthore Community Hosp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 101, 184 Cal. Rptr. 914
(1982); Dance v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 420 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1982); Silver v. Castle
Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972), reh. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1131 (1973); McElhinney v. William Booth Memorial Hosp., 544 S.W.2d 216
(Ky. 1976); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589 (1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817
(1963); Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., Inc., 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901
(1982); Gotsis v. Lorain Community Hosp., 46 Ohio App. 2d 8, 345 N.E.2d 641 (1974); Huf-
faker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398 (1975); Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt.
419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966). See also supra note 33.
111. See infra notes 128 & 129 and accompanying text.
112. 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398 (1975).
113. Id. at 275, 540 P.2d at 1399. The pertinent bylaw provided:
Only physicians and dentists licensed to practice in the State of Oregon, who can
document their background, experience, training and demonstrated competence, their
adherence to the ethics of their profession, their good reputation, and their ability to
work with others, with sufficient adequacy to assure the medical staff and the gov-
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grant the requested privileges. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld
the lower court's sustaining of the hospital's demurrer, despite the
petitioner's argument that the language of the bylaws was imper-
missibly vague. The court disagreed, saying:
Once it is accepted that a hospital may set higher standards of care for
hospital staff admissions than the mere possession of a state license it be-
comes difficult to conceive of ways of setting out in greater detail the higher
degree of medical care desired. Fruitless elaborations may be indulged in
without further specificity. Rather than curtailing the discretion at the out-
set for failure to define that which would be difficult to define in any event,
the court should more appropriately look to the exercise of the discretion to
see if it has been abused." 4
Regarding Dr. Huffaker's specific objection that the criterion of
documented ability to work well with others was not a valid con-
sideration because it had no bearing on his medical competence
and was not related to the quality of patient care, the court
responded:
This contention has some merit, and raises a rather sensitive issue. The is-
sue of a pleasant and cooperative personality has no direct influence on
medical competence in a technical sense. But it must be remembered that
the hospital is concerned not only with medical competence, but primarily
with the quality of care the patients receive in the hospital.
Most other courts have found that the factor of ability to work smoothly
with others is reasonably related to the hospital's object of ensuring patient
welfare. This conclusion seems justified for, in the modern hospital, staff
members are frequently required to work together or in teams, and a mem-
ber who, because of personality or otherwise, is incapable of getting along,
could severely hinder the effective treatment of patients.""
A strong line of cases from other jurisdictions supports this view."'
Several cases from California are clearly in opposition. 1 7 As
erning body that any patient treated by them in the hospital will be given a high
quality of medical care, shall be qualified for membership on the medical staff ....
Id. at 276, 540 P.2d at 1399 (emphasis added by the court).
114. Id. at 276-77, 540 P.2d at 1399-400.
115. Id. at 277-78, 540 P.2d at 1400 (emphasis in original).
116. See, e.g., Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 64 (D.D.C.
1963); Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 478-79,497 P.2d 564, 568, cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 1131 (1973); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Me-
morial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, 280-81, 281 A.2d 589, 593, cert. denied,404 U.S. 995 (1971);
Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. Super. 418, 422-23, 231 A.2d 389, 393 (1967);
Hagan v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp. of Rhode Island, 102 R.I. 717, 726, 232 A.2d 596, 601
(1967). See also supra note 17.
117. See Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P.2d 93 (1959);
Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d 431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551
(1962); Martino v. Concord Community Hosp. Dist., 233 Cal. App. 2d 51, 43 Cal. Rptr. 255
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noted previously in Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center,118 the
California Supreme Court said that the hospital's appointment cri-
terion of "ability to work with others" was to be "read to demand
that there be a demonstrable nexus between the applicant's ability
to 'work with' others and the effect of that ability on the quality of
patient care provided."' 19 In reaching its decision, the court noted
that all hospital institutions are primarily concerned with the pro-
vision of high quality care, that medical staff decisions must take
into account all factors which relate to the goal of high quality
care, and that the ability to get along with others is such a fac-
tor.120 The court held, however, that in order to avoid the dangers
of arbitrary or irrational application or use as a subterfuge to hide
inappropriate considerations, the criterion must be interpreted
to demand a showing, in cases of rejection on this ground, that an appli-
cant's inability to "work with others" in the hospital setting is such as to
present a real and substantial danger that patients treated by him might
receive other than a "high quality of medical care" at the facility if he were
admitted to membership. 21
After Miller, the California appellate court in Pick v. Santa
Ana-Tustin Community Hospital'22 did uphold a hospital ad hoc
committee's finding that "Dr. Pick's manifested personality would
create and present a real and substantial danger to the high qual-
ity of medical care both to his patients as well as other physicians'
patients."' 2 3
The California cases aside, there is a strong consensus among
other jurisdictions that the ability to work with others alone is an
appropriate criterion to apply with respect to applicants for admis-
(1965). But see Comment, Hospital Staff Privileges: The Need for Legislation, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 900 (1965), which is critical of such holdings. For example, "[I]t is difficult to under-
stand how a hospital is to adhere to modern concepts of hospital administration if it cannot
consider the ability of its staff members to cooperate .... " Id. at 916.
118. 27 Cal. 3d 614, 614 P.2d 258, 166 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1980); see also supra notes 61-68
and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 628, 614 P.2d at 266, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
120. Id. at 628, 614 P.2d at 267, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
121. Id. at 629, 614 P.2d at 267, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
122. 130 Cal. App. 3d 970, 182 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1982); see supra notes 54-58 and accom-
panying text.
123. Id. at 975 n.4, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 88 n.4. It seems obvious that the medical staff
committee was ably advised as to the meaning of Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center. See
also Unterthiner v. Desert Hosp. Dist. of Palm Springs, 33 Cal. 3d 285, 188 Cal. Rptr. 590,
656 P.2d 554 (1982); Cipriotti v. Board of Directors of Northridge Hosp. Found. Medical
Center, 147 Cal. App. 3d 144, 196 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983).
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sion. 1 4 The proof required in all other jurisdictions to support a
denial is less rigorous than California's "real and substantial dan-
ger" test articulated in Miller and applied in Pick. Indeed, several
courts seem to require merely that the hospital show the possibil-
ity of prospective disharmony.'25
While it is clear that inability to work with others is an accept-
able ground for denial of initial appointment, refusal to reappoint,
or termination during appointment, fundamental principles of due
process play a vital role in the way courts will view the action
which hospital management takes in any particular situation.
VII. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
The courts will increasingly be called upon to balance the
sharply conflicting, but equally compelling, interests of practition-
ers and the hospital. While there is no right to medical staff ap-
pointment, 26 its attainment is vital to most physicians and other
health care practitioners. Continuing technological advances in
medical science, complicated and sophisticated techniques for di-
agnosis and treatment, and the availability of an army of highly
skilled health care professionals other than physicians who form
part of the institutional team, make hospital appointment a neces-
sity. At the same time, hospitals are required to be much more
selective about medical staff appointments because of corporate li-
ability."17 In this scenario, the disruptive practitioner creates due
process dilemmas for the hospital.
Aggrieved practitioners are entitled to due process whether they
are denied initial appointment, terminated during the appoint-
ment period or not reappointed. 28 Both aspects of due pro-
cess-procedural and substantive-must be considered when the
hospital has to deal with the disruptive practitioner.
The essential elements of procedural due process are well-estab-
lished. The aggrieved practitioner who requests a hearing must re-
124. See supra note 59.
125. See, e.g., Hagen v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp. of Rhode Island, 201 R.I. 717, 232
A.2d 596 (1967), discussed supra notes 70-71; Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398
(1975), discussed supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 33.
127. See supra notes 6 & 7.
128. This subject is well covered in the literature; see, e.g., Ludlam, Physician-Hospi-
tal Relations: The Role of Staff Privileges, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 879-900 (1970);
Springer, Medical Staff Law and the Hospital, 285 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE
952-59 (Oct. 21 1971); Cray, Due Process Considerations in Hospital Staff Privilege Cases,
7 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 217 (Fall 1979).
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ceive notice of the grounds for the proposed adverse action to be
taken against him and notice of the hearing date, time and place.
The hearing should be before an impartial tribunal, that is, one
whose members have not previously officially acted on matters re-
lating to the requested hearing. The aggrieved practitioner must
have an opportunity to produce evidence in his behalf and to rebut
the evidence against him. The findings and recommendations of
the hearing tribunal must be based on evidence produced at the
hearing. Finally, the aggrieved practitioner must have an opportu-
nity to appeal to a higher authority-generally the governing body
of the institution.
129
Substantive due process encompasses notions of fairness with re-
spect to rules, standards, criteria and measures to be applied to
practitioners. Thus, the rules and standards must be reasonable
and not discriminatory; they must not be arbitrary or capricious,
and they must be fairly applied. 3 '
With respect to substantive due process, ability to work with
others and similar personal qualities are valid criteria for hospitals
to apply in deciding to appoint or reappoint practitioners. In
Schlein v. Milford Hospital,' the court noted:
[Ilt is entirely consistent with due process for a hospital, in deciding
whether to grant staff privileges, to evaluate those personal qualities of a
physician that reasonably relate to his ability to function effectively within
a hospital environment. A doctor's ability to work well with others, for in-
stance, is a factor that could significantly influence the standard of care his
patients received. Due process does not limit the hospital's consideration to
technical medical skills.'
3 2
All courts agree that the personal qualities noted above are ap-
plicable to situations in which patient care and safety are
threatened. It is our belief that such criteria are equally relevant to
the practitioner whose inability to work with others disrupts or ad-
versely affects the orderly operation and management of the insti-
tution. If the hospital is prevented from operating efficiently and
effectively, sooner or later patient care will suffer. Thus, hospital
129. See Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'ys, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 681 (1974); Silver, 629 P.2d 1116; Ladenheim, 394 N.E.2d 770. The JCAH, supra note
3, at 10.2.4.2 and 10.4.2.10 requires a "fair hearing," but does not specifically state the ele-
ments necessary to transform a hearing into a fair one. Equally ambiguous language is con-
tained in the Medicare Conditions of Participation, 42 C.F.R. § 405.1021(e)(7) (1983).
130. Substantive due process in the hospital setting is concerned with the fairness of
such things as hospital and medical staff bylaw provisions, rules and regulations.
131. 423 F. Supp. 541 (D. Conn. 1976).
132. Id. at 544. See supra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
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management must have wide latitude to define in broad terms the
type of behavior which is deemed detrimental either to high qual-
ity care or to the orderly efficient operation of the institution.
Moreover, the hospital must have the capability to address the
problem with a variety of strategies ranging from collegially infor-
mal approaches to strict due process procedures.
VIII. THE HOSPITAL'S RANGE OF RESPONSES TO DISRUPTIVE
BEHAVIOR SHORT OF FORMAL DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES
In order to handle the disruptive practitioner effectively, hospi-
tal management, particularly the medical staff leadership, must
have a range of options for actions which will not trigger the for-
mal procedural due process mechanisms. It is difficult enough for
hospitals to handle the clinically incompetent or marginally com-
petent practitioner, that is, to develop sufficient evidence to sup-
port the grounds for appropriate corrective action. It is even more
difficult and time consuming to develop the supporting justifica-
tion for the formal due process proceeding against the disruptive
practitioner. As we have noted, the practitioner may be a compe-
tent clinician, perhaps even among the best in the institution.
Many of his colleagues may never experience his unacceptable be-
havior so that it is more likely that they will believe his argument
that the others are "out to get him." Moreover, support personnel,
who know about his behavior, may be intimidated by the abusive
individual. Their complaints are often ignored or discounted by
the leadership. 3' They will not report him or testify against him
because they fear reprisal. Indeed, even the peers of the disruptive
practitioner are often threatened and intimidated by threats of re-
prisal or litigation. Disruptive practitioners are much more likely
to make personal attacks on the medical staff leadership and hos-
pital management. The longer they are permitted to get away with
the offensive behavior the more difficult it will be to stop them.
Hospital medical staff bylaws should provide for administrative
actions which may be undertaken by medical staff leadership or
hospital management without resort to formal procedural due pro-
133. In a California hospital some time ago, operating room personnel continually re-
ported instances of gross sexual abuse of anesthetized female patients by an anesthesiolo-
gist. The reports were ignored for at least a year. Finally, an anonymous letter to law en-
forcement officials triggered a massive newspaper expose, state investigations, conviction of
the physician, hundreds of lawsuits, and of course, almost complete disruption of the hospi-




cess requirements. Such administrative actions include interviews,
written admonitions, letters of reprimand, probation, supervision
and suspension of admitting privileges for a specific time period. 3 "
These administrative actions are advantageous, in that they give
the practitioner early notice that his behavior is taken seriously
and will not be tolerated by the leadership. They also provide
other practitioners and hospital employees with a mechanism by
which they can trigger action by those authorized to act.
An administrative reprimand will serve notice that the practi-
tioner's behavior is creating inharmonious working conditions
which may result in impaired patient care. Such an early interven-
tion also affords the affected physician an opportunity to either
discuss his concerns and explain his actions or moderate his behav-
ior. Moreover, if there is no justification for the physician's action,
hospital management will be empowered to act quickly and
effectively.
The hospital's medical staff and corporate bylaws must provide a
method by which admonitions, letters of reprimand, probation and
even suspension of admitting privileges for a period of up to thirty
days may be used by the hospital as warnings to a disruptive prac-
titioner. Both the medical staff and the corporate bylaws must also
expressly provide that the due process provisions, which are an in-
tegral part of a formal disciplinary proceeding, do not apply to
these administrative actions."3 5 The informal action permits the
hospital to attempt to alter behavior which the hospital has found
to be intolerable.
These strategies are designed to provide a mechanism for early
resolution of potentially divisive situations. It is acknowledged that
an administrative suspension will affect the physician's ability to
admit and treat patients within the hospital. Therefore, it is likely
that such action will have a negative financial impact on the physi-
cian. However, the hospital's general corporate authority includes
the ability to temporarily suspend an individual if such action is
necessary in order to provide a safe environment for hospital pa-
134. It is noted that certain states have enacted statutes requiring that the curtail-
ment of clinical privileges due to misconduct or professional malpractice be reported to the
state board of medicine or osteopathy. See, e.g., Reporting Incidents of Professional Miscon-
duct Act, Act No. 1985-48, 1985 PA. LEGIS. SERv. 269 (to be codified at 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 448.806.1). Such a statute does not affect whether the hospital can legally suspend a
physician's admitting privileges without resorting to the due process provisions of the medi-





tients. If the suspension is for a period of less than thirty days, the
medical staff leadership or the hospital should be free to act with-
out fear of injunction or the strict and time-consuming require-
ments of a formal hearing before effective action can be taken.
Here, one must balance the broad interests of the hospital to main-
tain a harmonious and safe environment for all its patients, em-
ployees and medical staff against the interests of one practitioner
whose actions are deemed to be disruptive. In this context, the
hospital's interests should prevail even against an assertion of con-
stitutionally protected free speech. 136
Informal and rapid administrative action will also enhance insti-
tutional morale-an important concern of hospitals in this time of
increasing risks. As noted earlier, hospital employees or other med-
ical staff appointees are often the primary targets of the disruptive
practitioner. If these "victims" view medical staff leadership or
hospital administration as indecisive and impotent, they may leave
the hospital. No hospital can afford to lose its experienced employ-
ees, who are especially unlikely to tolerate unwarranted abuse. If
disgusted medical staff practitioners decide to take their patients
to other more harmonious and collegial health care settings, the
hospital will suffer immediate financial consequences.
It is also possible that aggrieved employees may take matters
into their own hands.13 7 In Thompson v. Grays Harbor Community
Hospital,38 a hospital was faced with a practitioner whose inap-
propriate behavior included reference to another staff appointee as
a "butcher," disruptive behavior toward hospital employees, and
temper tantrums. Rather than take quick administrative action,
the hospital's approach was described by the trial court as "careful
136. See, e.g., Herrington v. Mississippi Regional Medical Center, 512 F. Supp. 1317
(S.D. Miss. 1981), where a public hospital was held to have acted properly in discharging an
anesthetist whose criticisms undermined the working relationship between a superior and
herself, which was deemed essential to efficient and safe departmental relations. The court
concluded:
In summary, the Court finds, as did the jury, that the plaintiff's criticisms were not
protected under the First Amendment. In any event, the defendants proved that the
plaintiff would have been fired even in the absence of the alleged protected speech.
Applying the ultimate balance to the issues of fact and law in the case, the Court
concludes that the ultimate balance weighs heavily in favor of the hospital's interest
in providing anesthesia services to the public unencumbered by internal strife and
discord.
Id. at 1321. See also Hoberman v. Lock Haven Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 1178 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
137. See supra note 133.
138. 36 Wash. App. 300, 675 P.2d 239 (1983).
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and restrained. 39 Faced with a hospital administration which re-
fused to react to their complaints, the hospital's nurses retaliated
by trying to harm Dr. Thompson economically in the following
manner:
Various parents testified they took their children to the emergency room at
Grays Harbor Community Hospital and asked for Dr. Thompson. According
to the witnesses the hospital staff made them wait longer, told them falsely
Dr. Thompson was not available and made some disparaging remarks about
her. In some cases, the parents were encouraged to have their children
treated by the house physician instead of by Dr. Thompson. Some of the
parents followed this advice.'40
Such testimony led to a verdict for Dr. Thompson, which was
based on the jury's finding that as a result of the action of its em-
ployees, the hospital was vicariously liable for the tortious interfer-
ence with Dr. Thompson's medical practice. The trial judge, how-
ever, felt the verdict was unjustified and entered a judgment not
withstanding the verdict. The court of appeals disagreed with the
trial court and reversed the judgment, thus reinstating the jury's
verdict and $90,000 in damages on behalf of Dr. Thompson.
The Thompson case clearly represents a Hobson's choice for the
hospital. Delay can often lead to liability. At the same time, imme-
diate action by the hospital may lead to litigation by the disruptive
physician.
In our view, the hospital should lean toward taking action in the
interests of patient care and a well-run hospital. The risks of delay
far outweigh the risks of an early attempt to deter disruptive
behavior.
IX. CONCLUSION
Handling the disruptive practitioner is a growing problem for
hospital medical staff and administrative leadership. The dilemma
of the modern hospital is that its traditions do not provide that
leadership with the proper background to deal effectively with dis-
ruptive behavior, but legal and other external pressures compel a
rapid learning process. Not only is disruptive behavior infinitely
variable, but it is likely to increase as those pressures continue to
mount on institutions and practitioners. Hospitals must be able to
employ a wide variety of options to deal with this complicated and
multifaceted problem, while at the same time providing appropri-
139. Id. at 311 n.5, 675 P.2d at 245 n.5.
140. Id. at 303, 675 P.2d at 241.
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ate deference to fundamental due process considerations. The ulti-
mate goal of the hospital-its legal mandate-is consistent high
quality patient care. Today, that goal will be realized in institu-
tions which maintain harmonious environments with strong, intel-
ligent and effective lay and medical staff leadership under sound,
flexible bylaws. All of hospital management-the governing boards,
the medical staff leaders and the administration-will be called
upon to make difficult decisions involving the equally compelling,
but often directly conflicting, interests of the hospital and the
practitioner. The balance today must be in favor of the institu-
tional imperative.

